What Causes the Child Penalty? Evidence from Same Sex Couples and Policy Reforms by Andresen, Martin Eckhoff & Nix, Emily
D
ISCU
SSIO
N
 PAPERS
902
Martin Eckhoff Andresen and Emily Nix
What Causes the Child 
Penalty?
Evidence from Same Sex Couples and Policy Reforms
Discussion Papers No. 902, March 2019 
Statistics Norway, Research Department 
Martin Eckhoff Andresen and Emily Nix 
What Causes the Child Penalty? 
Evidence from Same Sex Couples and Policy Reforms 
Abstract: 
Women experience significant reductions in labor market income following the birth of children, while 
their male partners experience no such income drops. This “relative child penalty” has been well 
documented and accounts for a significant amount of the gender income gap. In this paper we do 
two things. First, we use a simple household model to better understand the potential mechanisms 
driving the child penalty, which include gender norms around child care, female preferences for child 
care, efficient specialization within households, and the biological cost of giving birth. The model, 
combined with the estimated child penalties for heterosexual and same sex couples, suggests that 
the child penalty experienced by women in heterosexual couples is primarily explained by female 
preferences for child care and gender norms, with a smaller contribution due to the biological costs of 
giving birth. Second, we provide causal estimates on the impact of two family policies aimed at 
reducing the relative child penalty: paternity leave and subsidized early child care. Our precise and 
robust regression discontinuity results show no significant impact of paternity leave use on the 
relative child penalty. Early subsidized care seems to have more promise as a policy tool for affecting 
child penalties, as we find a 25% reduction in child penalties per year of child care use from a large 
Norwegian reform that expanded access to child care. 
Keywords: Gender wage gap, labor supply, child penalty, paternity leave, child care, same sex 
couples, event study, regression discontinuity, instrumental variables 
JEL classification: I21, J13, J22, J71 
Acknowledgements: We thank seminar participants at the University of Rochester, Claremont 
McKenna University, Statistics Norway, RAND, Arizona State University, LSU, the University of Oslo, 
VATT Helsinki, Warwick University and Erasmus University. We also thank Kenneth Aarskaug Wiik, 
Edwin Leuven, Matias D. Cattaneo, Sebastian Calonico, Heather Antecol, Adam Sheridan, Trude 
Gunnes, Petra Persson, Antonio Dalla Zuanna, Thor Olav Thoresen and Nina Drange for helpful 
comments and suggestions. All errors remain our own. Andresen gratefully acknowledges financial 
support from the Norwegian Research Council (grant no. 236947) 
Address: Martin Eckhoff Andresen, Statistics Norway, Research Department. E-mail: mrt@ssb.no 
 
 
Discussion Papers comprise research papers intended for international journals or books. A preprint of a Dis-
cussion Paper may be longer and more elaborate than a standard journal article, as it may 
include intermediate calculations and background material etc. 
 
 
© Statistics Norway 
Abstracts with downloadable Discussion Papers 
in PDF are available on the Internet: 
http://www.ssb.no/en/forskning/discussion-papers 
http://ideas.repec.org/s/ssb/dispap.html 
 
ISSN 1892-753X (electronic) 
Sammendrag
Kvinner opplever et stort inntektsfall i etterkant av at de får sitt første barn. Dette inntektsfallet
vedvarer i mange år, et fenomen som blir kalt “child penalty”. I sterk kontrast ser vi ingen slik
respons for fedres inntekt. Dette mønsteret er dokumentert for en rekke land, som USA, Sverige,
Danmark og Storbritannia, og kan forklare en vesentlig andel av den gjenværende forskjellen
i inntekt mellom menn og kvinner i vestlige land, der kvinner i stor grad har tatt igjen menn
hva gjelder andre forhold som utdanning og yrkesdeltagelse, som kan drive inntektsforskjeller
mellom kjønnene.
Vi vet lite om hva disse kjønnsforskjellene skyldes eller hva som kan bidra til å redusere dem. I
denne artikkelen forsøker vi å forstå hva det er som driver den kjønnsspesikkeede responsen av
barn på arbeidstilbud. Vi bygger først en enkel modell som inkorporerer re mekanismer som er
foreslått i litteraturen: Det biologiske sjokket en fødsel og graviditet utgjør, kvinners preferanse
for å være hjemme med barn, kjønnsnormer knyttet til mødres og fedres arbeidstilbud og til slutt
eektiv spesialisering. Det siste skyldes at å barn medfører mye husholdningsarbeid, og det kan
være eektivt at foreldrene spesialiserer seg på hjemme- og markedsarbeid på en slik måte at de
får utnyttet sine komparative fortrinn. Modellen viser at alle disse momentene vil kunne skape
det samme kjønnspesikke mønsteret i responsen på barn heterole par.
For å forstå hva som driver den kjønnsspesikke responsen på barn sammenligner vi het-
erole og homole par. Den teoretiske modellen forteller oss at responsen på barn i homole
par vil være forskjellig avhengig av hvilken mekanisme som driver eekten. Resultatene viser
at heterole par i Norge responderer på barn omtrent som i andre vestlige land: Mødre opplever
redusert inntekt med omtrent 22% umiddelbart etter fødsel, en eekt som vedvarer de fem neste
årene. For far er det ingen respons. I sterk kontrast nner vi at lesbiske mødre som føder barn
reduserer sin inntekt med omtrent 13% etter fødsel, mens medmødre får redusert inntekt med
omtrent 5%. Begge mødre i lesbiske par øker inntekten sin igjen de påfølgende årene, slik at det
etter 4-5 år ikke lenger er noen “child penalty” for disse parene. Utvalget av homole par er for
lite til å trekke presise konklusjoner.
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Ved å kontrollere for en rekke mål for eektivitet på arbeidsmarkedet og sammenligne kun
lesbiske og heterole par som ligner hverandre før fødsel, nner vi at eektiv spesialisering trolig
ikke er årsaken til forskjellen mellom disse parenes respons. Vi konkluderer med at den kjønnede
responsen på arbeidstilbud av barn er drevet av en kombinasjon av kvinners preferanser for å
være hjemme med barn og kjønnsroller.
Videre undersøker vi to vanlige politiske tiltak for å redusere de såkalte “child penalties”:
Subsidiert barnehage for de minste og fedrekvoter i foreldrepermisjonen. Ved å bruke samtlige
endringer i den norske pappakvoten fra 2005 til 2014, nner vi sterk støtte for at fedre responderer
på pappakvoter ved å ta ut mer permisjon. Dette ser imidlertid ikke ut til å ha noen eekt på
kjønnsspesialiseringen på arbeidsmarkedet. Vi nner heller ingen tegn på endringer i normer
rundt permisjonsfordeling når vi ser på om økt pappapermbruk for det første barnet påvirker
permisjonsdelingen for senere barn.
Vi nner større eekter av subsidiert barnehage for de minste barna. Ved å utnytte den sterke
utbyggingen av barnehageplasser i etterkant av barnehageforliket i 2002 kommer vi rundt prob-
lemet med at det ikke er tilfeldig hvilke barn som bruker barnehage. Vi nner at kjønnsspe-
sialiseringen i arbeidsmarkedet som følge av barn kan reduseres med omtrent 25% per år med
tidlig barnehagebruk, men at dette kun gjelder mens barnet bruker ekstra barnehage, ikke i de
påfølgende årene.
Denne studien går til kjernen av en av de viktigste gjenværende årsaken til kjønnsforskjeller
mellom kvinner og menn: Responsen på barn. Ved å sammenligne lesbiske med heterole par er
vi blant de første til å peke på hva som driver den kjønnede responsen på arbeidstilbud av barn,
som er vesentlig for å forstå hvordan og om politikere kan addressere dem. Videre undersøker vi
eekten av to sentrale virkemidler i familiepolitikken for å redusere disse kjønnsforskjellene, og
våre funn bør derfor være sentrale for politikere som er interesssert i disse spørsmålene.
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1 Introduction
The gender income gap has narrowed signicantly over the past 50 years.1 However, one compo-
nent of the gender income gap has proven to be relatively persistent: the income penalty women
in heterosexual couples experience after the birth of children. In contrast, men in heterosexual
couples experience no such income penalty upon the birth of children. This income penalty ex-
perienced by women is often termed the “child penalty”2 and its importance has recently been
documented in a variety of countries such as the United States, Denmark, Norway, the United
Kingdom and Sweden (see Chung et al. (2017), Kleven et al. (2018), Bergsvik et al. (2019), Kuziemko
et al. (2018) and Angelov et al. (2016)). As other determinants of the gender income gap have
declined in importance, the proportion of the gap that can be explained by the “relative child
penalty”, the dierence in the child penalty experienced by fathers compared to mothers, has
increased. Kleven et al. (2018) show that in Denmark the relative child penalty accounted for 80%
of the gender gap in 2013, compared to only 40% in 1980.3
The stubborn persistence of the relative child penalty among heterosexual couples is a puzzle,
particularly given the overall decline in gender wage gaps. In this paper we attempt to under-
stand the relative child penalty and how it might be reduced. First, we try to understand why the
relative child penalty exists by using a household model and comparing the child penalties of het-
erosexual and same sex couples, estimated in an event study framework, which the model predicts
should behave dierently depending on what causes the child penalty. Second, we present causal
evidence on the impact of two common policies proposed to reduce the relative child penalty:
paternity leave and use of subsidized formal childcare.
In the rst half of the paper, we consider commonly suggested mechanisms behind the child
1See Blau and Kahn (2000). Additionally, economists have provided evidence on a number of explanations for
this decline, such as the narrowing of the gender education gap, the decrease in labor force discrimination, and
family oriented policies. For an overview, see Olivetti and Petrongolo (2016).
2We acknowledge that some readers may object to using the term “penalty” if this phenomenon is not driven by
discrimination. This paper aims at disentangling the mechanisms behind these disparate income penalties, but we
will use the term “child penalty” for the income loss following child birth independently of the mechanism, in line
with the literature.
3Of course, other determinants of the remaining gender gap are also important, and may interact with the
impact of children. For example, Goldin (2014) focuses on the structure of the labor market as an explanation for the
remaining gender gap.
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penalty: gender norms, female preferences for child care, ecient within household specializa-
tion, and biology. To understand which of these mechanisms drives the relative child penalty, we
estimate and compare the child penalties among same sex male and same sex female partners to
the child penalties experienced by heterosexual couples using administrative data from Norway.
Our approach is motivated by suggestive evidence that same sex couples split household chores
more evenly (Goldberg et al., 2012). If the absence of pre-set gender roles lead same sex couples
to also split the burden of child care more evenly, child penalties may look very dierent among
same sex couples. To identify the child penalties within each couple type, we use an event study
approach as in Kleven et al. (2018).
To more formally understand how our results can disentangle the roles of preferences, the
biological costs of giving birth, household specialization and gender norms around child care in
the heterosexual relative child penalty, we build a simple model of household labor supply before
and after the arrival of children. In the model, partners may dier in their relative productivity
in the labor market versus home production, men and women may have dierent preferences
for child care, and pregnancy imposes a xed cost to the woman physically bearing the child.
We model gender norms as a disutility for men in heterosexual couples from women working
outside the home after the child is born, as in Fernández et al. (2004). The model yields the
following intuitive predictions. As expected, and by construction, each of these mechanisms yield
a relative child penalty for heterosexual couples. If household specialization drives the relative
child penalty within heterosexual couples, the model predicts similar child penalty patterns in
otherwise similar same sex couples. If part of the relative child penalty is driven by the costs of
giving birth, the model predicts a relative child penalty for the pregnant mother versus the non-
pregnant mother among same sex female couples, but no such dierence among same sex male
partners. If intra-couple gender norms cause the relative child penalty in heterosexual couples,
the model predicts that we will not nd relative child penalties among same sex couples. If
women have greater preferences for child care than men, the model predicts child penalties for
both partners in same sex female couples and smaller or no penalties for partners in same sex
male couples. However, if child penalties are driven by preferences for child care, the model also
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predicts that child penalties for lesbian mothers will be smaller than for heterosexual women.
This result is driven by the fact that heterosexual women can lean on their male partners, who
derive less utility from time with children, to make up for the time they spend in home versus
market production.
Similar to previous papers, we nd that women in heterosexual couples experience an average
drop in income of approximately 22% following the birth of the rst child, and this drop persists
over time. Their male partners experience no child penalty in income. We also show that this large
drop in female income translates to an overall household income drop of 6-8% for heterosexual
households, and this household income penalty also persists over time. For female same sex
couples we nd an initial 13% drop in the income of the partner who gives birth. Her partner
experiences an initial income drop of 5%. Despite a larger immediate drop in income, the mother
who gives birth catches up with her partner around two years after birth, and from that point
on both mothers experience similarly sized child penalties which decrease over time; by four
years after birth there is no longer a child penalty. While the initial household income penalty
experienced by lesbian couples on the birth of the rst child is statistically indistinguishable from
the same income penalty experienced by heterosexual couples (although shared more evenly
between partners), by ve years after birth lesbian couples no longer experience a household
income penalty. Since the model predictions regarding specialization require comparisons of
child penalties across couples with similar comparative advantage dierentials, we expand on the
traditional child penalty event study by introducing two approaches motivated by the household
model to control for comparative advantage dierences across couple types. The dierences
between heterosexual and lesbian couples remain in these specications.
These patterns suggest that while biology may play a small role, the majority of the relative
child penalty experienced by heterosexual couples is due to preferences and gender norms. While
the population of same sex male couples with children is very small, we nd no income penalty
for either spouse. This is also consistent with a dominant gender norms and female preferences
mechanism, and a smaller role played by biology. Last, we investigate the possibility that all
of the dierences are in fact driven by same sex couples caring less about their children’s out-
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comes. While this assumption would be consistent with our results, it is not consistent with one
additional result: children of same sex couples outperform children of heterosexual couples on
English, reading and math tests at age 10, even after conditioning on a large range of observable
dierences between the couple types.
To further understand the anatomy of the child penalties and how they dier between couple
types, we next decompose the overall income penalty into a series of potential decisions made
by couples after birth which all may impact income: total contracted hours, binary indicators of
employment at various levels, family friendliness of the employer, and sickness absence. Results
indicate that the dierences between lesbian and heterosexual couples are primarily driven by
dierent responses at the intensive margin of labor supply, not at the extensive margin, nor
through dierences in occupational sorting.
We next turn to investigate the impact policy might have on the relative child penalty. Policy
makers might wish to know how to decrease the relative child penalty in order to reduce the
overall gender income gap, particularly given the results from the rst half of the paper. In the
second half of this paper, we estimate the impact of two commonly proposed family policies aimed
at reducing the relative child penalty: paternity leave and subsidized early child care. Paternity
leave may reduce the relative child penalty by targeting fathers while subsidized access to high
quality child care may reduce the relative child penalty by providing households with a viable
substitute for the mother’s time at home.
For paternity leave, we use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the impact of six re-
forms to the paid paternity leave quota in Norway from 2005-2014. Using robust semi-parametric
RD methods we estimate a strong rst stage: the reforms signicantly increased paternity leave
takeup. However, despite fathers taking additional leave, we nd no signicant impact on ei-
ther spouse’s labor income. Consistent with the lack of impact on individual incomes, there is
no impact of paternity leave on the relative child penalty. Pooling all reforms, we can rule out
reductions in mothers’ earnings from an extra week of paternity leave larger than around 5 to 7
per cent of the child penalty.
Paternity leave use may, however, impact the relative distribution of home and market work
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between the two spouses in a way that does not necessarily show up in earnings. To see if
this is the case, we use the same paternity leave reforms to estimate the impact of leave use
for the rst child on leave use for subsequent children. If paternity leave use aects norms and
preferences related to child care, we might expect to see fathers who are induced by the policy to
take additional leave for the rst child to also increase their use of paternity leave for subsequent
children. Again, however, this is not what we nd. Instead, our precise and robust RD estimates
show no impact of leave use on future take up of leave for any of the reforms, with non-signicant
estimated eects of less than 0.1 additional week of leave taken by fathers for subsequent children
per week of leave use for the rst child.
In the nal section of the paper we use a large-scale Norwegian reform from 2002 that ex-
panded child care availability for 1-2 year olds to investigate the eect of access to high quality
child care on parent’s child penalties over time. The market for care for toddlers was severely
rationed before this reform. The reform increased subsidies to child care institutions, leading to a
rapid expansion of care slots. To identify the impact of increased access to high quality child care,
we exploit the variation across municipalities and over time in construction of new slots and cen-
ters, instrumenting individual child care use with the rationed, municipality-level availability of
slots in a variation of the setup in Andresen and Havnes (2019). Results indicates positive eects
on mothers’ labor income at ages 2 and 3 that scales to reduce the child penalty experienced by
mothers by around 25% for each additional full year of early child care use, although the impacts
are not persistent in the long run.
Our paper is most closely related to the literature on child penalties. We use the simple event
study approach from Chung et al. (2017), Kleven et al. (2018), Bergsvik et al. (2019), and Angelov
et al. (2016) to identify child penalties.4 Together, our results and the results from these papers
suggest that there does not currently exist a sample of heterosexual couples, whether in dierent
countries, educational groups, or socioeconomic class, that does not experience large relative
child penalties. However, as we show in our household model, it is impossible to understand
why these relative child penalties occur by estimating child penalties for heterosexual couples
4Lundborg et al. (2017) also show the child penalty occurs among heterosexual couples who use IVF to get
pregnant, which may be even closer to the process that same sex couples experience when conceiving children.
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alone. In this paper, we nd very dierent patterns when estimating the same event study for
same sex couples, and use these results combined with predictions from the household model
to shed some light on why heterosexual couples experience such large relative child penalties.
Related to our results, Kuziemko et al. (2018) also nd evidence that preferences of heterosexual
women may play an important role in the child penalty. Specically, they show that women in
heterosexual couples exhibit time inconsistency in these preferences, nding that women report
more negative opinions toward female employment after giving birth relative to before birth.
Another closely related paper is Kleven et al. (2019) which shows the same general pattern in
child penalties across a number of dierent countries and nds that the magnitude of the child
penalties experienced by women are correlated with elicited gender norms.
Our paper also contributes to a smaller literature focused on same sex couples and their chil-
dren. Baumle (2009) nds that in the United States, partnered gay men on average earn less than
partnered heterosexual women, while the opposite is true for partnered lesbian women. Schnee-
baum (2013) also nds that lesbian women earn more than heterosexual women, but focuses
on the dierences between primary and secondary earners, as well as those with and without
children. Black et al. (2007) review existing data, provide additional summary statistics for the
United States, and suggests a role for economics in understanding household choices of gay and
lesbian couples. Looking more specically at parenting, Goldberg et al. (2012) look at a sample
of 55 lesbian couples and nd they report sharing household chores and child care more evenly
than a comparison group of 65 heterosexual parents. Others have investigated labor supply (An-
tecol and Steinberger, 2013), parental leave use (Evertsson and Boye, 2018; Rudlende and Lima,
2018) and time use (Martell and Roncolato, 2016) for same sex couples, as well as the impact of
legal recognition (Alden et al., 2015). Finally, Moberg (2016) and Rosenbaum (2019) investigates
the dierential response to child birth across heterosexual and same sex couples in Sweden and
Denmark.
While comparing the outcomes of children born to same sex and heterosexual couples is not
the focus of this paper, we also present evidence that children of same sex (mostly lesbian) couples
have higher math, English, and reading scores at age 10, and the eect is signicant at the 99th
10
percentile for English and reading scores. These results remain signicant when controlling for
a large range of observable dierences between heterosexual and same sex couples. This result
contributes to a charged debate in the United States, as demonstrated in oral arguments for the
landmark 2015 Supreme Court case Obergefell v. Hodges, which legalized same sex marriage.
Previous studies of children born to same sex couples have been criticized by both sides of the
debate on the basis of three methodological concerns: non-representative samples,5 mislabeling
children from heterosexual couples as children of homosexual couples or vice versa,6 and small
sample size. In this paper, our use of administrative data containing the population of children of
same sex couples in Norway and the ability to identify such children accurately largely overcomes
these concerns.
The second half of our paper contributes to the literatures on paternity leave and child care, by
looking specically at the impact of these policies on the individual and relative child penalties.
A number of papers have estimated the impact of paternity leave policies on dierent outcomes.7
A few particularly relevant studies include Cools et al. (2015) and Kotsadam and Finseraas (2011;
2013) who nd positive impacts of the Norwegian paternity leave policies on child outcomes and
their later equality in division of household work looking at the 1993 reform.8 Dahl et al. (2014)
nd substantial peer eects of the Norwegian policy in 1993 using a regression discontinuity ap-
proach, and we use a similar approach to identify the causal eect of exposure to paternity leave
on the amount of leave taken for later children. Rege and Solli (2013) nd a decrease in father
earnings long term in Norway from the 1993 reform using a dierence in dierence approach and
Johansson (2010) nds that a Swedish policy increased mother’s earnings but had no impact on
fathers. Ekberg et al. (2013) nd that fathers are no more likely to take sick leave to care for a sick
child long term using a Swedish reform, and Patnaik (2019) nds a large and persistent change
5Studies often used “opportunity samples” where couples volunteer to participate.
6In particular, a number of studies label children born to a heterosexual couple, which later divorces and one
spouse enters a same sex relationship, as children of homosexual couples. Under this approach, if these children
do worse than children in stable heterosexual couples, it is impossible to disentangle the impact of divorce versus
having one set of same sex parents.
7A larger literature looks at the impact of maternity leave on maternal earnings and child outcomes. See, for
example, Lalive and Zweimüller (2009); Lalive et al. (2014); Carneiro et al. (2015); Baker and Milligan (2015).
8Halrynjo and Kitterød (2016) nd small and contradictory eects from quasi-experimental evaluations in a
survey of studies on Nordic daddy quotas.
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in the division of household labor from a Canadian daddy quota. This selection of papers from a
broader literature captures the fact that existing work on paternity leave nds either no impact
or positive impacts on children. The literature nds either no impact or a decrease in fathers’ in-
come and an increase in mothers’ income, pointing at least to the possibility that paternity leave
may decrease the relative child penalty. We add to this literature by exploiting six consecutive
paternity leave reforms, one of which decreased the quota, using robust semi-parametric regres-
sion discontinuity methods. We show that the impact is symmetric across reforms that increased
and reduced the quota, and by stacking all six reforms we provide precise zero estimates for the
eect on labor income. Furthermore, we show no eect of exposure to paternity leave for the
rst child on leave use for subsequent kids, suggesting that preferences for leave taking is not
aected by exposure to paternity leave.
Our results on paternity leave are also related to Antecol et al. (2018) who nd that gender
neutral tenure clock stopping policies do not help women in academia, and may even hurt their
careers. We examine a similar shift toward more gender neutral leave policies, and nd that
the results from Antecol et al. (2018) are not unique to academia. Paternity leave does not help
women’s careers, at least not in terms of income, across the population of professions in Norway.
Finally, we contribute to the large literature on the impact of child care use on female labor
supply. Most closely related is Andresen and Havnes (2019) on which we build. Havnes and
Mogstad (2011) nd no eects of a similar expansion of care for older kids’ outcomes in Norway
in the mid 1970’s. Other related papers in this eld are summarized in e.g. Blau and Currie,
2006; Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2018; Morrissey, 2016. In this paper we focus specically on the
impact of access to child care on the individual and relative child penalties experienced by men
and women within heterosexual couples. Although the literature nds mixed evidence, we nd
positive impacts of child care access on female labor market outcomes, and thus that child care
may reduce the relative child penalty experienced by heterosexual women.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a model for
household labor supply in the presence of children and derive testable predictions. In Section 3
we describe our approach to identify child penalties across couple types. In Section 4 we outline
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the institutional background and the data, and in Section 5 we present the main results. In Section
6 we present our empirical strategies and results on the impact of paternity leave and access to
child care on the heterosexual child penalties. In Section 7 we conclude.
2 A model of household labor supply in the presence of children
In this section we develop and solve a simple household model. The model includes the most
commonly suggested mechanisms for the child penalty: gender norms around child care, spe-
cialization within households, female preferences for child care, and the impact of giving birth.
The solutions of the model provide testable predictions that we bring to the data. Our model
is loosely adapted from similar household models in Fernández et al. (2004) and Olivetti (2006).
Once solved, the model shows that while each of these mechanisms generate a relative child
penalty for heterosexual couples, comparisons with same sex couples will allow us to distinguish
between mechanisms when we estimate individual and relative child penalties for heterosexual
and same sex couples in the data.
There are three periods. In the rst period, households consist of two adults. In the second
period, the child arrives in the household (either adopted or birthed by a female adult).9 In the
second and third period, the household consists of the two adults and the child. Each adult is
endowed with 1 unit of time in every period. In each period households choose the amount of
labor each adult allocates between home and labor market production. The two adults may be of
any gender (man and women, two men, or two women). The quasi linear utility function of each
spouse i ∈ a, b is given by:
Ui (c, θ, t−i) = c+ (1 + at) β ln θ + η ln (1− ti) X¯i − αt−iZ¯i (1)
where c is consumption and θ is household production. at represents the additional utility
from household production once the child arrives (so a1 = 0, and a2, a3 > 0). Z¯i is an indicator
9We do not model the fertility decision or allow parents to make labor market decisions in anticipation of chil-
dren. While these are important issues (see for example Bursztyn et al. (2017)), they are beyond the scope of this
paper. We do allow for an income gap before children, which could capture some of these points.
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equal to 1 if the individual is a male married to a female in periods 2 and 3, X¯i is an indicator
equal to 1 if the individual is female and 0 if the individual is male, and ti and t−i are own and
spouse’s labor supply. β represents the preferences for home production, which are shifted by
at at the arrival of the child, and η is the additional utility women get from being at home with
children, capturing potential dierences in gender preferences over time with children. α is the
disutility men get from each hour their wife works when they have children, capturing gender
norms around child care.10
There is no saving or borrowing, and in each period household consumption is joint and equal
to the sum of spouses’ earnings. For simplicity, we do not model wage setting, and simply take
as given the wages of each spouse wi and w−i, so that
c = witi + w−i
(
1− δtS¯
)
t−i
where S¯ is an indicator equal to 1 in period 2 and 3 if the spouse is a woman who gave birth. δt is
the productivity shock, which we think of as capturing the health shock of giving birth, as well
as other biological components such as breast feeding.
Household goods (including child quality) are produced by the following production function
θ = kih (1− ti) + k−ih (1− t−i) (2)
where ki ≥ 0 are productivity parameters, h′ > 0, h′′ ≤ 0, and h (0) = 0.
The household maximizes utility by choosing each spouse’s division of labor in each period,
where household utility is given by
∑
i
λiUi (c, θ, t−i)
10Survey evidence shows large dierences in the norms towards working women with young children compared
to working women without children. As an example, 80% of the respondents in the ISSP in 2002 think that mar-
ried women without children should work full time in the United States, while only around 15% think the same
about women with children below school age. Similar dierences appear for other countries, including Sweden and
Denmark, see International Social Survey Program (ISSP) from 2002. See also Kleven et al. (2019).
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and λi is the weight of each spouse in household decisions. This assumes Pareto eciency in
household decisions and is consistent with a number of household bargaining problems.11
There are no dynamics to the problem. This means we can solve the problem sequentially,
maximizing ta and tb in each period. For each period, the couples solve the following equation,
taking the home production process in equation 2 as given:
max
ta,tb
(λa + λb)
(
wata + wbtb − δwbtbS¯ + β ln θ
)
+λaη ln (1− ta) X¯a+λbη ln (1− tb) X¯b−λaαtbZ¯a
(3)
The rst order conditions are:
(1− δ) S¯iwi
ki
=
(1 + at) βh
′
(1− ti)
kih (1− ti) + k−ih (1− t−i) +
λiηX¯i
ki (λi + λ−i) (1− ti) +
λ−iαZ¯−i
ki (λi + λ−i)
These wage equations yield the following predictions:
1. Female preferences for child care: The income penalty is increasing for all women as
η increases. The income penalty for heterosexual men is decreasing. However, for any
given η > 0, the increase in the income penalty experienced by lesbian women due to an
increase in η is smaller than the increase in the income penalty for heterosexual women.
The relative child penalty for heterosexual couples is increasing in η at an increasing rate
if h′′ < 0 and at a constant rate otherwise. The child penalty for lesbian couples is zero
if δ = wa
ka
− wb
kb
= 0. Otherwise, there is no contribution to any existing relative child
penalty for lesbian couples so long as h′′ is constant. By construction, η has no impact on
the incomes of gay men, and cannot account for a relative child penalty for gay men.
2. Biology: The income penalty is increasing for the woman who gives birth as δ increases.
The relative child penalty for lesbian and heterosexual couples is increasing in δ at an
increasing rate if h′′ < 0 and at a constant rate otherwise. δ has no impact on the income
or relative child penalty of gay men by construction.
11This is a very simple model by design. It assumes Pareto eciency, but this has some important drawbacks.
See Del Boca and Flinn (2012) for a discussion of alternative approaches. Notice that we assume that the bargaining
weights do not vary by couple type. An alternative approach to capture gender norms could be to assume that in
same sex couples λa = λb and in heterosexual couples λa > λb, where λa represents the Pareto weight of the man.
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3. Gender norms: The income penalty for heterosexual women is increasing as α increases
and the income penalty for heterosexual men is decreasing. The relative child penalty for
heterosexual couples is increasing in α at an increasing rate if h′′ < 0 and at a constant rate
otherwise. By construction, α has no impact on the income and relative child penalties of
gay and lesbian women.
4. Intra-household specialization: Let spouse a have a comparative advantage in market
work, so that wa
ka
≥ wb
kb
. The income penalty for spouse a is decreasing as wa
ka
− wb
kb
increases,
while the income penalty for spouse b is increasing as wa
ka
− wb
kb
increases. The relative child
penalty for heterosexual, lesbian, and gay couples is increasing as wa
ka
− wb
kb
increases.
In Appendix Table A1 we summarize the main predictions of the model. Every mechanism leads
to a child penalty that diers between mothers and fathers in heterosexual couples, which is why
it is so hard to disentangle mechanisms when looking only at heterosexual couples. Adding same
sex couples allows us to distinguish between mechanisms. Based on the model, we can rule out
specialization if we compare similar couple types in terms of market and household productivity
and we don’t see a similar relative child penalty for lesbian and gay couples and heterosexual
couples in periods 2 and 3. Biology plays a role if we see an income penalty for the woman
giving birth and a relative child penalty for lesbian and heterosexual couples. We can rule out
that women simply get greater direct utility from childcare if we don’t see an income penalty for
both women in same sex female couples.
Perhaps the most surprising result that comes out of the model is the fact that the child penal-
ties for lesbian women due to female preferences for child care will be smaller than the child
penalty for heterosexual women due to the same mechanism, which we also show via a simula-
tion of the predicted wages as η, the female preference for child care, increases in Figure 1. The
intuition is that in heterosexual couples, the husband will increase labor supply to the market
in order to compensate for lost income from the mother, while in lesbian couples both spouses
will have to balance their mutual desires to spend more time at home with the need to maintain
consumption by providing labor to the market. This will be an important caveat for our results.
We also report simulations demonstrating the impact of each of the other mechanisms in Figure
16
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Figure 1: Model Predictions: Simulations for Preferences and Biology
Note: Left panel show individual income penalties relative to full time income in period 1, and right panels show
child penalty by couple type. To produce the simulations we set h(1− ti) = 1− ti. The baseline parameter values
are: ka = kb = 1, λa = λb = .5, and β = 5. At baseline, wages of both partners are normally distributed with
mean 10 and standard deviation 1. At baseline α = η = δ = 0. In panel 1, we solve for 100 equally spaced grid
points of η ∈ [0, 40], keeping all other values xed.
A1 in the Appendix. These gures plot the child penalty, the percentage change in income rel-
ative to the rst period of each couple on the left hand side and the relative child penalty, the
dierence between the child penalties of spouse a and b on the right hand side, based on the time
allocations that maximize equation 3 as we vary each parameter (η, δ, α, and wa) individually.
3 Empirical strategy
To bring the model predictions to the data, we must rst identify child penalties across couple
types. To identify the child penalty for each partner in each couple type we adopt an event study
framework as in Kleven et al. (2018). The choice to have children is potentially endogenous to
many other determinants of income. However, the precise timing of birth allows us to address
this endogeneity. Specically, if children impact a given labor market outcome of interest such as
income, then the precise year in which the child arrives will correspond to a sharp discontinuity
in income. Provided the other determinants of income do not also experience discontinuous
changes when the child arrives for reasons other than the child’s arrival, we can attribute the
corresponding discontinuity in income to the arrival of children.
This suggests a simple regression of the outcome of interest on event time dummies to iden-
tify child penalties. For our main results we also include gender specic age and year dummies
which control exibly for gender specic life-cycle and time trends in income. The results with
only event time dummies are included in Figure A2 in the Appendix and are very similar, but
Kleven et al. (2018) show that including age and time dummies performs better in identifying
child penalties. Event study frameworks such as this have been used to investigate, among other
things, the economic impacts of inheritances (Druedahl and Martinello, 2016), hospital admis-
sions (Dobkin et al., 2018) and family health shocks (Fadlon and Nielsen, 2017).12
More formally, let t represent event year, with t = 0 corresponding to the year in which the
couple’s rst child is born. Let yit be the labor market outcome of interest for individual i at event
12Borusyak and Jaravel (2016) revisits the identication problem in event study designs, pointing to the challenge
of aggregating post-event dummies and the impossibility of identifying cohort or individual xed eects together
with age and event time dummies. Fortunately, these are not problems in our setting.
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time t. We estimate the following equation to identify the child penalties
yit =
Parent-type event time dummies︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
j 6=−1
∑
k
αjk1[t = j,Ki = k] +
Gender- specic age proles︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
l
∑
m
βlm1[ageit = l, Xi = m] (4)
+
∑
n
∑
o
γno1[Tit = n,Xi = o]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gender-specic year shocks
+
∑
p
ηp1[Ki = p]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Type xed eects
+it
Where Xi is the gender (male, female) of parent i, ageit is the age of parent i at event time
t, Tit is the calendar year for individual i at event time t, and Ki is the parent type: mother or
father in heterosexual couple, mother or co-mother in a lesbian couple, and father or co-father
in a gay couple. 1[A] is the indicator function for event A. Standard errors are clustered by
couple and robust to heteroskedasticity. The event time dummy the year before birth is omitted,
which implies that all estimates of event dummies are relative to the year before birth for that
specic parent type. Note that while we allow life-cycle and time trends to vary by gender, we
do not allow them to dier within gender.13 Equation (4) is equivalent to running the regressions
separately for mothers and fathers if we only estimate the equation for heterosexual couples.14
Notice that all parents in our sample eventually have children, so that the event dummies
are identied from comparisons of same-aged parents with a youngest child aged j to parents
of children at other ages in the same calendar year. Thus, if the exact timing of birth is as good
as randomly assigned conditional on gender-specic age proles and calendar-year shocks, our
estimates can be given a causal interpretation as the impact of children on earnings. Kleven et al.
(2018) show that the event study approach we use here performs well at identifying both short
and long run child penalties compared to alternative approaches such as using instruments for
rst birth.
Our objects of interest are αjk, the change in the outcome for a parent of type k at child age
13This means that the eect of age and year on income is the same for all women, be they in heterosexual or
lesbian couples.
14While it is possible to estimate equation (4) separately for heterosexual mothers and fathers, lesbian mothers
and co-mothers and gay fathers and co-fathers, estimating the equation jointly allows us to exploit the large number
of heterosexual couples to help identify these control variables for the same sex couples as well as heterosexual
couples.
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j compared to the earnings the year before birth. Notice that these child penalties include the
impact of subsequent children that may appear in later years. Ideally, we would use a log-linear
specication of equation 4 so that we could interpret the coecients as percentage changes in
earnings, but the presence of zeros in the outcome complicates matters. To convert these absolute
estimates to percentage child penalties, we follow Kleven et al. (2018) and construct the following
measure of the child penalty.
Cjk =
αˆjk
E(yˆ | t = j,Ki = k) (5)
The interpretation of Cjk is the percentage drop in the outcome for parent type k at child
age j relative to the predicted outcome absent children. When computing condence intervals
or standard errors for these estimates, we use a bootstrap, clustering at the couple, to account for
the fact that the denominator is an estimated object.
3.1 Comparing heterosexual and same sex couples
The simple event study identies the causal eect of having children on labor market outcomes
of mothers and fathers in heterosexual couples, mothers and co-mothers in lesbian couples, and
fathers and co-fathers in gay couples. These results are interesting on their own, so we highlight
them below. However, any dierences across couples types are only informative regarding the
cause of the heterosexual child penalty if the distribution of other factors that may determine
changes in labor income around the time of the arrival of children are also identical across couple
types. In addition to the dierences highlighted by our model, the way to get children is clearly
dierent between same sex and heterosexual couples. In particular, it is reasonable to suspect
that the preferences for children is stronger among same sex couples, because the procedure for
most of them will involve more costs in the form of money and time.15
15One might argue that a more natural comparison group for lesbian couples getting children is heterosexual
couples getting children through IVF. This is not necessarily the case, however, because heterosexual couples doing
IVF have fertility problems, while lesbian couples do not necessarily have any fertility problems. Therefore, one
might speculate whether heterosexual couples doing IVF might have even stronger preferences for children than
lesbian couples doing the same.
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Our model predicts that the relative productivities in labor market and home production of
the two spouses, wi
ki
− w−i
k−i
, will determine the changes in labor income following birth due to
household specialization, and these relative productivity dierences may not be identical across
couple type. To rule out specialization driven by comparative advantage dierences across cou-
ples, we use the model to motivate two approaches. First, we investigate whether there are still
dierences in child penalties across couple types conditional on the relative productivity in the
couple by adding interactions of wi
ki
− w−i
k−i
and the event time dummies to the specication in
equation (4).
Unfortunately, we observe neither wages nor home productivity. We observe pre-child in-
comes, yit and y−it . This is sucient if ki = k−i, or if one of the following conditions hold. First,
our general household model includes household production before and after the child arrives.
In that case, specialization will occur before the child arrives and will be captured by pre-market
income gaps. Provided the household productivity parameters are unchanged or linearly related
over time, then yit−y−it controls for wiki −
w−i
k−i
. Second, if k is instead identical for all women and
smaller than k for all men , then controlling for yit − y−it should also be sucient.
To control for specialization, we exibly control for the dierences in own and spouse’s earn-
ings prior to birth interacted with event dummies, by adding
∑
j θj1[t = j](yi− y−i) to equation
(4), with income dierences measured at the start of our panel, 4 years prior to birth. To the
extent that comparative advantage is captured by the relative income levels of the two spouses,
these exible event dummy controls will pick it up and we can attribute the remaining child
penalties from αjk to the other possible mechanisms highlighted by the model. Notice that these
controls capture more than the intended comparative advantage. In particular, they also capture
the autocorrelation in earnings over time. When presenting these results, we scale by the pre-
dicted earnings from the baseline estimates in equation (4), and bootstrap condence intervals for
the scaled results clustering on couple. We interpret any remaining child penalties in earnings as
coming from sources other than specialization. As an alternative, we control for the dierences in
years of education interacted with event time dummies, another measure related to labor market
productivity.
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Second, in case the (untestable) assumptions required for the rst approach to work do not
hold, we also report results using propensity score matching to construct samples of heterosexual
couples that are similar to lesbian couples based on pre-birth observables. To this end, we esti-
mate a logit model for the probability of being a lesbian couple in the sample of lesbian and het-
erosexual couples, using as covariates a full set of municipality dummies to capture urban/rural
dierences, both spouses’ age at birth and their interaction, indicators for number of children and
both spouses’ years of education and their interaction. We do not match on pre-birth earnings,
as this is our outcome and could lead to over matching. We then re-estimate equation (4) using
the propensity score estimates as weights to get a sample of heterosexual couples that are more
similar to lesbian couples based on pre-birth observables. We bootstrap the entire procedure
clustering on couple.
4 Institutional context, data and sample selection
Norway was the second country in the world to legally recognize same sex partnerships in 1993
through the Partnership Act, and Figure 2 documents the number of new same sex male and fe-
male partnerships in Norway in the following years.16 Under this act, a partnership was legally
equivalent to marriage in most respects. However, partnerships were restricted regarding chil-
dren. Same sex couples were not eligible for domestic adoptions, were not eligible for publicly
subsidized assisted fertility treatment, and the registered spouse of a woman giving birth was not
automatically registered as the second parent (as the pater est principle established for married
heterosexual couples). It wasn’t until 2002 that a change to the rules for adoptions allowed same
sex couples to formally adopt the children of their spouse. This change to the guidelines allowed
same sex couples to be considered for adoption of stepchildren just like heterosexual couples. The
guidelines required a stable relationship and having had a de facto parenting role for the child in
question for some period of time, most often ve years, as well as consent from the existing par-
ent. If the child was already registered with two parents, the other parent was given the right to
16Aarskaug Wiik et al. (2014) investigates the stability of these same sex marriages and partnerships, and nd
that they are less stable than heterosexual marriages.
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Figure 2: Number of new same sex partnerships and marriages in Norway, 1993-2017
Source: Statistics Norway Statistikkbanken, tables 10160 and 05713.
express his opinion on the adoption, but the case was ultimately decided by the adoption agency.
In practice the increasing use and availability of assisted fertility treatments among lesbian
couples challenged this ve-year rule, as planned children of lesbian couples conceived through
assisted fertilization abroad became increasingly common. Therefore, in 2006 the Norwegian
government claried the rules so that the ve-year rule would not apply in cases where the
fatherhood cannot be established, such as with IVF treatment using an anonymous donor. In
2009, a new marriage act was introduced which equalized same sex and heterosexual marriages
in all but one respect: A same sex spouse cannot later adopt the child of his/her spouse that was
in turn adopted from a country that does not allow adoptions to same sex couples. The new
marriage law from 2009 also gave lesbian couples the right to IVF treatment in Norway, but only
when using non-anonymous donor, as the law requires all children conceived through IVF in
Norway to have the possibility of knowing the identity of the donor father at age 18. Before
this, lesbian couples often traveled abroad to get IVF treatment, most often in Denmark. Even
after the new law was passed, many couples still travel abroad either to speed up the process or
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because they want to use an anonymous donor. If conception happens through IVF treatment
with a non-anonymous donor in a recognized (private or public) fertility clinic, co-mothership
can now be registered at birth, but otherwise the couple must go through an adoption process in
order for the partner to be formally registered as the co-mother.
For gay couples, getting children is naturally more complicated. Surrogacy is illegal in Nor-
way, but some gay couples still enter into surrogacy agreements with surrogate mothers from
abroad. No special rules apply to these children, and parenthood must be established according
to the law when returning with the child. Typically, this means that the (most often biological)
father will declare fatherhood upon returning to Norway and be registered as the father, and
that the other spouse will then have to start the adoption process to be registered as co-father.
Alternatively, gay and lesbian couples have formally been eligible for adoption since 2009 just
like heterosexual couples, but this possibility is typically limited by the lack of donor countries
willing to adopt children to these couples.17 Domestic adoption at birth is very rare in Norway,18
but some children are adopted by their foster parents after a number of years in foster care. This
typically happens at much later ages and we would not expect this to have an impact on labor
market status around the birth of the child.
We observe registrations of legal parent status in the population registers. In practice, we
therefore observe children appearing in same sex couples at various times following birth. When
identifying births to same sex couples in the administrative data, we try to be as certain as possible
that we capture planned arrivals of children by a same sex couple that happens in the year of birth
of the child, without losing too many observations because children often aren’t legally registered
with both parents until the following year.
Following birth, Norwegian parents have been entitled to a generous paid parental leave since
17The rst adoption from abroad to a same sex couple in Norway happened in the fall of 2017, when Colombia
became the rst donor country to approve an adoption to a Norwegian same sex couple following a controversial
Supreme Court ruling from 2015. In the empirical analysis, we restrict attention to children born in 2014 at the latest,
so that foreign adoptions to same sex couples will not be relevant for this paper.
18Ruling out adoptions by near family and adoptions of foster- and step-children, as few as two to three children
are adopted away at birth or right thereafter per year in Norway. In addition, the biological parents are given a
say on prospective adoptive parents, and their opinion is given considerable weight in the decision among potential
adoptive parents. This makes matters worse for same sex couples if the biological parents prefer a heterosexual
couple. In practice, this means that this option is not very relevant for same sex couples.
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1977. Total parental leave is currently 49 weeks at 100% replacement or 59 weeks at 80% replace-
ment rate, but the length of leave has been steadily increased since the mid 1980’s, reforms that
we exploit and describe in more detail in Section 6. Benets are capped at around 600,000 NOK or
70,000 USD. The leave is split in three with a quota for the mother, one for the father (since 1993)
and the rest to be distributed among the parents. Leave spells can also be graded, allowing par-
ents to combine work and leave for a longer period of time. A parent must be legally registered
as a parent to the child at the time of leave start.
In order to qualify for leave, a parent must have been employed for at least 6 of the 10 months
prior to birth, and the annual earnings must exceed a low threshold of around 50,000 NOK or
6,000 USD. Benets from sickness absence or some other benets may qualify as earnings for
meeting this requirement. Mothers who do not qualify for parental leave are entitled to a one-
time-benet of 63,000 NOK or approximately 7,600 USD. In addition to paid leave, all parents have
job protection for another year if they want to take additional unpaid leave. Taken together, this
means that the total leave uptake is a much better measure of the time the father spends o work
with the child than the mother, because mothers more often stay home with the child on unpaid
leave than fathers and also stay home using the one-time benet when they are not eligible for
parental leave.
Following parental leave, Norway has a well developed, regulated, and highly subsidized child
care sector with high coverage, as documented in gure 13a. The alternative to sending children
to formal care is mostly home care by the parents, for which there is a cash for care benet given
to the parents of young children19 who do not use the subsidized formal care system. Because
of the heavy subsidies for formal care, the market for paid child care outside this system is very
small, but subsidies are available for both private and public suppliers of formal care.
19The age eligibility criteria has varied somewhat over the period, but cash for care is now available for children
aged 13 - 24 months only. The benet is relatively generous at 7,500 NOK or 900 USD per month, assuming no formal
care use.
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4.1 Data and sample selection
Our data comes from Norwegian administrative registers covering the entire resident population.
Through unique identiers we link individuals over time and to family members such as parents,
enabling us to identify couples around the time of the arrival of a child. Data on residency status,
date of birth, gender, municipality of residence and links to mothers and fathers comes from the
ocial population register, and is provided on January 1st every year from 2000 onward. We
obtain data on education for the years 1980 - 2016 from ocial education registers on the level,
eld and length of education as well as whether or not an individual is enrolled in a study program
by October 1st each year.
Our labor market outcomes come from two sources. The primary data on annual labor market
earnings comes from the tax records. Importantly, these are wage incomes that include taxable
benets such as sickness and parental leave and benets.20 We also observe employment spells
from the FD-Trygd database. These cover most important employment spells from 1992 - 2003 and
all employment spells (not self-employment) from 2003 - 2014. To create comparable measures
across most of the sample period, we exclude spells of self-employment from the pre-2003 data
and include only the employment spell with the most contracted hours for the post-2003 data.21
From these spells, we construct the following measures of monthly labor supply, measured for the
spell that covers the 15th and 16th of each month: Dummies for the employment spell exceeding
4, 20 and 30 contracted hours per week, whether the primary employment is in the public sector
(2003 - 2014 only) and a proxy measure of the family friendliness of the rm. The latter measure
is the leave-out-mean of mothers with children below 15 years that work in the rm. In addition,
we measure the total working hours of all employment spells for the years 2003 - 2014.
For parental leave and sickness absence spells we also pull data from FD Trygd, the register
of the Norwegian Public Insurance system. For sickness absence, we measure the number of
sickness days due to physician-certied spells of leave that exceed 16 days in a given month,
scaled by the grade in the case of graded sickness absence to measure ecient days lost. For
20We set negative incomes to 0, comprising less than 0.2% of the observations.
21In more than 95% of the cases, the spell considered most important in the pre-2003 data is the one with the
longest contracted hours.
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parental leave spells we measure how many weeks of leave were taken for a particular child,
which we infer from the start and stop dates of the leave spells and birth dates of the children.
Details on this measure is provided in Appendix B.1.
Finally, we exploit data on child care use and availability. For the measure of child care slots,
we use administrative data from the child care centers on the number of slots for children of
dierent ages by December 15th each year. At the individual level, however, we can measure
the exact use of child care at ages 13 - 36 months for the years 2000 - 2011. For these years, a
cash for care benet was given to children who did not attend formal care in a given month. If
we assume that all children who do not use child care apply for the benet, which is relatively
generous,22 we know exactly which children attended how much care for each month. From these
data, we construct precise measures of full-time equivalent years of child care use from ages 13 -
36 months.
For ourmain sample of same sex and heterosexual couples, we want to be as certain as possible
that we capture the arrival of planned children in a household with two parents. This is more
challenging given that the formal adoption process to the other parent in some cases may take
time. We therefore start with the universe of children born in Norway in the years 2001-2014. We
assign the parents to be the rst parents ever registered to the child, which gives us a large number
of heterosexual parents and a small number of same sex parents. This approach allows for one of
the parents to be missing for a year or two until the legal adoption procedure is completed. We
restrict attention to children where both parents were legally registered as parents at the latest in
the year the child turns 3 in order to minimize the risk of capturing partners not present at birth,
and also to avoid getting an unbalanced sample of children even in the year of birth.
We furthermore keep only rst-born children to both parents. In case of multiple births, we
keep the couple in the sample only once. We drop a handful of lesbian couples who receive
multiple kids in the same year and register dierent parent status for each child, and keep only
couples where both spouses reside in Norway the year before birth. Lastly, we keep in both
samples only couples where the rst child appears at ages 22 to 60 for both parents, giving us
22Throughout 2001-2009, which is the period we exploit, the benet was around 3,500 NOK or 420 USD per
month, but varied somewhat.
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some time before and after birth to observe earnings.
For the long sample, which we use only in the long-run analysis of changes to the child penalty
over time, we start with all children born 1971 to 2010 where both mother and father are regis-
tered. We restrict attention to rst-born children of both parents, and in cases of multiple births
we include the parents only once. We drop a small number of couples where one of the parents
(most often the father) had several children with dierent people in the same year, and drop kids
with same sex parents. Unfortunately, we do not observe residency status or changes of legal
parent status before the year 2000, which means that we may be allocating a very small number
of later adoptees to their adoptive parents even before the adoption happens.23
This leaves us with a main sample of 250,296 heterosexual couples, 634 lesbian couples and
32 gay couples, and a long sample of 721,291 heterosexual couples. We match these mothers and
fathers to their labor market earnings in all years from t− 4 to t+ 5 or t+ 15, centered around
the birth of the rst child, to investigate labor market responses to the child’s birth. Note that for
children born after 2002, we will not see a full 15 years of income after birth because our data ends
in 2017. Since most children born to same sex couples are born late in the sample period, we see
later labor market outcomes less frequently for same sex couples relative to heterosexual couples.
For the main sample we therefore restrict the window of interest to be between t− 4 and t+ 5 to
limit this imbalance. Summary statistics for these samples are given in Table 1. The population
of lesbian couples is reasonably large. In contrast, the number of gay couples with children is
very small, which corresponds to very imprecise estimates for this group in the next section. As
expected, the population of heterosexual couples with children is very large. We can also see that
same sex couples have much higher pre-birth labor earnings relative to heterosexual couples.
This suggests that it might be important to control for income and initial income gaps in order to
compare the child penalty between similar heterosexual, lesbian and gay couples as described in
Subsection 3.1. Lesbian couples are slightly older than heterosexual couples at rst birth, and are
also slightly more educated. Reecting the rules on establishing legal co-parent status, the age
23In the main sample of heterosexual couples we see that the average age at which both parents are rst registered
is 0.02 years, indicating that this problem should be extremely minor, and probably smaller back in time due to higher
marriage rates.
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Table 1: Summary statistics by couple type
Heterosexual couples Lesbian couples Gay couples
Long sample Main sample Main sample Main sample
Birth year (rst child) 1971-2010 2001-2014 2001-2014 2001-2014
A: Child characteristics
Birth year 1992.0 2007.7 2010.7 2011.9
(11.5) (4.00) (2.87) (1.60)
Multiple birth 0.015 0.020 0.069 0.25
(0.12 (0.14) (0.25) (0.44)
Female child 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.52
(0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.48)
Age at adoption 0.022 0.48 1.34
(0.17) (0.81) (0.94)
B: Parent characteristics, year before birth
Mother Father Mother Father Mother Co-mother Father Co-father
Parent type (K) 1 2 1 2 3 4 5 6
Age at rst birth 26.3 28.7 27.8 30.3 32.2 32.8 38.4 38.2
(4.04) (4.83) (4.23) (5.00) (4.12) (5.64) (5.21) (6.05)
Labor income 250.3 346.3 362.7 487.3 488.9 480.0 737.4 813.2
(1,000s of 2017 NOK) (152.4) (243.6) (188.9) (314.6) (196.7) (308.3) (264.3) (378.7)
Years of education† 14.2 14.0 15.2 14.6 16.4 16.0 17.2 17.1
(2.94) (3.00) (2.89) (3.01) (2.42) (2.65) (2.44) (2.57)
N couples 721,291 250,296 634 32
Note: Summary statistics on estimation samples constructed as described in Section 4. Standard deviations in
parentheses. †Available from 1980 and onward only.
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Figure 3: Registered children to same sex couples, by year of birth and age at adoption
Notes: Own calculations, based on sample and data described in Section 4. Age at adoption refers to the age of the
child in the year we rst observe both parents registered.
at adoption is slightly delayed for lesbian couples compared to heterosexual couples, as it takes
some time for the co-mother to be legally registered.
5 Results
In this section we provide the main results on child penalties. First, Section 5.1 provides the
main estimates of child penalties across couple types, including household child penalties and our
attempts at controlling for specialization using and pre-birth earnings and education dierences.
Next, Section 5.2 decomposes the child penalties into a series of determinants of income that allow
us to investigate how lesbian parents’ labor supply choices dier from heterosexual parents’.
Lastly, Section 5.3 provides some evidence that the dierent parenting style that lesbian parents’
adopt, as evident by their dierent child penalties, does not seem to come at the expense of
children’s long-term schooling outcomes.
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5.1 Heterosexual and same sex child penalties
In Figure 4 we present the main results. The graphs report estimates of Cjk (see equation (5))
generated by the simple event study in equation (4). Starting with the rst row, the results for
heterosexual couples are shown on the left and lesbian couples on the right. Results for gay
couples are shown in the second row.24 As has been shown in many other papers, we also nd
that mothers in heterosexual couples experience large income penalties in the range of 20% of
their counterfactual earnings in the absence of children upon the birth of their rst child. Fathers
experience no income penalty upon the birth of the rst child. The graph for lesbian couples is
strikingly dierent. We nd that both mothers experience a child penalty the year after the child
is born, but initially the woman who gives birth has a child penalty more than double the size
of her partner. The drop in income, however, is much smaller than that of heterosexual moth-
ers, at around 13% and 5% of counterfactual earnings for mothers and co-mothers, respectively.
Moreover, 2 years after birth the woman who gives birth catches up and her penalty is no longer
statistically signicantly dierent from her partner’s. By ve years after birth, the child penalty
for both women has largely disappeared.
The fact that the lesbian partner who gives birth initially experiences a larger child penalty
than her partner suggests that biology plays a role in the child penalty, but only in the rst
year after birth. The fact that both partners experience child penalties, and that those penalties
are statistically indistinguishable from 2 years after birth onward, suggest that women have a
preference for time with children over career. Note that an alternative formulation of the model
might assume that this preference η is larger for the mother who gives birth within a lesbian
couple than the mother who does not, given that which mother gives birth is endogenous in
lesbian couples. However, if this is the case then we would expect to see a persistent gap between
lesbian mothers in later years, in contrast to the catch up that we nd. The last graph in Figure
4 corresponds to gay couples. Consistent with the small population size, the estimates are very
imprecise. However, the patterns are consistent with a gender norms, preferences, and biology
24In Appendix Figure A2 we also report the raw mean earnings by event time for each couple type, without
imposing any of the structure from equation (4), and the results are quantitatively similar.
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(a) Heterosexual couples (b) Lesbian couples
(c) Gay couples
Figure 4: Estimated child penalties across couples types
Note: Figures show the estimated child penalties from equation 4, scaled as described in eq. 5. Sample construction
and data as dened in section 4. Bootstrapped 95% condence intervals in gray using 200 replications and clustering
by couple. Note that the scale of the y-axes are separate for gay couples compared to heterosexual and lesbian
couples.
story. In the event study, neither partner experiences a child penalty.
These results are suggestive, but without removing the contribution of specialization we can-
not denitively pinpoint mechanisms. The impact of specialization might dier across couple
types and we observe quite dierent distributions of earnings and education before birth between
couple types. To address this, in Figure 5 we report estimates controlling for household specializa-
tion as measured by income or education dierences before birth interacted with event dummies,
as discussed in Subsection 3.1. Note that this gure presents the remaining child penalty after
removing the portion of the penalty explained by the productivity dierences. Except for some
dierences in the impact before birth that is likely caused by autocorrelation of incomes over
time for the income dierences specication, the gures are remarkably similar to the baseline
estimates for both the income and education measures of relative productivity. This suggests
that specialization alone cannot explain the dierences across couple types that we see. Note
that we only report results for heterosexual and lesbian couples, given the large imprecision in
the estimates for gay couples.
Finally, Figure 6 presents results from the matching exercise, where we have constructed
a sample of heterosexual couples similar to the lesbian couples on pre-birth observables such as
education, age and municipality of residence. Panel (a) of this gure reveals that the child penalty
for the matched sample of heterosexual couples looks very similar to the baseline child penalty
for heterosexual women, indicating that the dierent child penalties between the couple types
documented so far are not driven by dierences in the pre-birth covariates we include in the
propensity score model. Although precision is lower in the sample of lesbian couples, the results
are roughly comparable to the baseline estimates.
Last, we point out that these results do not appear to be driven by dierential fertility. First,
in Appendix Figure A4 we show that lesbian and heterosexual couples have almost identical
completed fertility during this period. Second, in Figure A5 we repeat the main exercise but
restrict to heterosexual and lesbian couples who do not have an additional child ve years after
the birth of their rst child. We nd that the results are unchanged.
The child penalty experienced by women in heterosexual couples is so large, it would seem
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(a) Using years of education dierences in t− 1
(b) Using labor market income dierences in t− 4
Figure 5: Partial child penalties, controlling for comparative advantage
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(a) Heterosexual couples (b) Lesbian couples
Figure 6: Child penalties in a matched sample
Note: Figure shows child penalties estimate from the baseline model in a sample matched to the lesbian couples on
pre-birth characteristics. In the sample of heterosexual and lesbian couples before birth, we estimate a logit model for
being a lesbian couple. Covariates include both spouses age and their interaction, both spouse’s years of education
and their interaction and a full set of municipality dummies. We then weight the baseline model with the propensity
score from this model, so that heterosexual couples who look more like lesbian couples on observables are given
higher weight. The entire procedure is bootstrapped, clustering on couple.
Figure 7: Child penalty, total household income
to imply an overall household income penalty. In Figure 7 we show this is the case by using the
total income of the two spouses as the outcome. What is particularly interesting is that both
lesbian and heterosexual couples experience the same initial income decline on the birth of the
rst child. However, this drop in income persists for heterosexual couples while it decreases over
time for lesbian couples. Note that this is despite the fact that lesbian and heterosexual couples
have relatively similar completed fertility, as we show in Figure A4 in the Appendix. We again
exclude gay couples from this analysis due to the small sample size, but as you would expect
based on the previous gures, gay couples experience even smaller household income penalties
compared to lesbian and heterosexual couples.
5.2 Decomposing the child penalty
To further understand the anatomy of the child penalty and what lesbian couples do dierently
than heterosexual couples, we estimate the child penalty separately for the following determi-
nants of income: extensive margin participation, an indicator for full time work, weekly con-
tracted hours of work, family friendliness or public sector status of the rm, and days of sick
leave. Just like the baseline event study, we construct a panel from 48 months before birth to 60
months after birth, and regress the outcomes on parent type-specic event time dummies and
gender specic age proles (in months) and monthly shocks. Unlike the baseline, to ease inter-
pretation of the various mechanisms, we do not scale the estimates like in equation 5. Therefore,
the estimates are interpretable as the eects of children at age (in months) j, relative to the eect
12 months before birth. Results are presented in gures 8 and 9. We begin in gure 8 by repeating
the baseline estimates, but unlike in Figure 4 these are unscaled. As expected, the child penalties
look largely the same as the baseline results with an immediate drop of around 100,000 NOK
(approximately 11,600 USD) for mothers in heterosexual couples that persist over the period we
investigate and a smaller and decreasing penalty for lesbian mothers. In panel (b) we plot eects
on the extensive margin of having any active employment relation. Unlike the baseline outcome
of labor earnings, we see a strong dip in employment around the time of child birth for mothers,
driven by employment spells not being active when mothers are on leave in contrast to mater-
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(a) Total labor income, 1,000 NOK (baseline outcome)
(b) Main employment relation at least 4h/week contracted
(c) Main employment employment relation at least 20h/week contracted
(d) Main employment relation at least 30h/week contracted
Figure 8: Decomposition I: Child penalties for heterosexual (left) and lesbian (right) couples
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(a) Weekly contracted hours in all employment relations, 2003 - 2014
(b) Main employment relation in public sector, 2003 - 2014, conditional on working
(c) Family friendliness of employer, conditional on working
(d) Days of sickness absence for spells exceeding 16 days, conditional on working
Figure 9: Decomposition II: Child penalties for heterosexual (left) and lesbian (right) couples
nity leave benets that replace earnings and are included in our income measure. Following the
initial dip, employment bounces back but stays below -0.1 for the period under study, indicating
10 percentage points lower probability of being employed compared to the baseline employment
rate 12 months before birth. In panel (c) we estimate impacts on a dummy indicating a full time
job, as dened by contracted weekly hours above 30. The fact that the impact on this measure
is larger than on the employment measure, at around a 20 percentage points reduction, indicates
that there is response both on the extensive and intensive margins of labor force participation:
some mothers drop out of the labor force entirely while others reduce labor supply and work part
time following child birth. As before, we nd little response among heterosexual fathers for these
measures.
For lesbian mothers, the response on the extensive margin of labor supply is slightly smaller,
but largely in line with the results for heterosexual mothers. Furthermore, when excluding the
immediate dip in employment that is cause by parental leave directly, lesbian co-mothers behave
similarly to their partners, reducing labor force participation by around 10 percentage points in
response to child birth. For the full time measure, however, the reduction is markedly smaller
for lesbian mothers than heterosexual mothers, indicating that part of the dierences in income
patterns are driven by more mothers working full time in lesbian than heterosexual couples fol-
lowing child birth. This dierence is mirrored in the outcome for total hours on top of Figure 9,
which we can measure for 2003 - 2014 only. Here we see reductions of total contracted hours of
around 10 hours for heterosexual mothers, while the response among lesbian mothers is smaller
and fully recovers 4-5 years after birth. Lesbian co-mothers behave much like their partners after
the rst year of leave, while heterosexual fathers increase total contracted hours. Summing up,
the dierences in the child penalties between heterosexual and lesbian mothers seem to be driven
by dierences in the response on the intensive, not the extensive margin.
Following Kleven et al. (2018), we also estimate the impact on two measures of workplace
exibility. The rst is a dummy for whether the employer is in the public sector, which is known
for its exibility and well regulated working conditions. The second is a measure of family friend-
liness that we construct at the rm-month level. It represents the share of mothers of children
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below 15 years of age among the other workers who have their primary employment relation
with the rm. Both of these measures, however, are dened only for employed people; since we
have shown that employment is endogenous to child bearing, these should be interpreted with
care. That caveat aside, the child penalties for these outcomes are plotted in panel (b) and (c) of
gure 9. We see strong positive trends in public sector employment for mothers in heterosexual
couples around child bearing. Ignoring the dip in the year of birth that is likely caused by the very
low employment rates of new mothers, mothers move into the public sector in anticipation of -
and following - child birth, while this trend is at for men. The trend in this outcome is relatively
similar for both partners in lesbian couples. Our measure of family friendliness suggests that all
types of mothers move to more family friendly rms in the period up to and following birth. The
fact that lesbian mothers do not experience long term child penalties, but are just as likely as
heterosexual mothers to move into family friendly rms, suggests that occupational selection in
response to children cannot fully explain the gender income gap post children.
Finally, we use a measure of days of sickness absence to see if childbirth may cause longer
term health shocks that impact income. The measure counts the full-time equivalent days of
absence due to sickness from physician-certied spells of leave that exceed 16 days, so will gen-
erally not include short term illness such as seasonal cold or u. It also include sickness absence
spells for dependents that require the employee to be absent, in particular young children. As
with the measures of family friendliness, this measure is conditional on employment.25 Results
indicate an unsurprising spike in sickness absence for heterosexual and lesbian mothers who will
eventually give birth during pregnancy. The results during the maternity leave period for most
of the rst year should be interpreted with care, as the measure of sickness absence is conditional
on employment, but sickness absence eventually stabilizes at a higher rate than before birth.26
The pattern is relatively similar for both partners in lesbian couples. Heterosexual fathers also
take slightly more sickness absence after the birth of children than before.
25Despite this, we occasionally see non-employed individuals in these data. We exclude the few non-employed
individuals who are registered with absence spells.
26Note that some of this could be caused by subsequent pregnancies.
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5.3 Child test scores
We have shown that individuals in same sex couples share the burden of child rearing more
evenly, and experience less severe household income penalties compared to heterosexual couples.
It is natural to ask if this reduction in the relative (and total) child penalty comes at the cost
of worse outcomes for children. If sharing the burden of child care is simply more ecient,
then same sex couples and their children could be better o than heterosexual couples and their
children. Alternatively, same sex couples could be choosing to substitute purchased child care
for home production, in which case their children could be equally well o, depending on the
quality of care. Last, same sex couples could be investing less in their children, in which case
their children would be worse o.
In Table 2 we present results from a simple regression of test scores at age 10 for the children of
heterosexual and same sex couples on a dummy for having same sex parents and an increasing set
of control variables across columns. Standard errors are clustered by both parents using two-way
clustering. The results in the rst column, corresponding to no controls, indicate that children
of same sex couples do much better than children of heterosexual couples, in the range of 0.4 to
0.6 standard deviations in the three subjects. Moving right, we gradually add more controls for
observable pre-birth dierences between same sex couples and heterosexual couples. Education
level in particular reduces the dierences quite a lot, but children of same sex couples still do
around 0.2 standard deviations better in both reading and English even when controlling for
our large range of observable characteristics. These results suggest that while same sex parents
appear to parent more equally and experience smaller costs to overall household income, their
alternative approach to child rearing does not come at the cost of child outcomes.27
27Although a further analysis of the relative performance of children from same sex and heterosexual couples is
beyond the scope of this paper, these results might also indicate stronger positive selection into child bearing among
lesbian couples that is not accounted for by our rich set of controls.
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Table 2: Impact on children: Test scores at age 10
Outcome variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Math 0.395*** 0.363*** 0.283*** 0.0893 0.0766
(0.0858) (0.0853) (0.0853) (0.0835) (0.0838)
Reading 0.410*** 0.352*** 0.263*** 0.146* 0.170**
(0.0832) (0.0833) (0.0836) (0.0821) (0.0810)
English 0.565*** 0.529*** 0.433*** 0.248*** 0.235***
(0.0800) (0.0794) (0.0803) (0.0773) (0.0777)
Pre-birth controls
Child gender X X X X X
Birth year dummies X X X X X
Age dummies (mother × father) X X X X
Municipality dummies X X X
Education level dummies (mother × father) X X
Income (mother, father, interact) X
Observations (min. over course type) 316,039 315,880 315,880 315,879 302,468
Children of lesbian couples 134 134 134 134 133
Children of gay couples 4 4 4 4 4
Note: Separate cross sectional regressions of test scores by course on couple type, including controls as indicated.
Sample consists of all children born 2001-2007 in the main sample described in Section 4, before conditioning on the
rst child or the age of the parents at rst birth. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at both parents using
two-way clustering. Test scores are normalized within course and year to have mean zero and standard deviation 1.
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Singleton observations are dropped.
6 The impact of family friendly policies
The results thus far suggest that the relative child penalty experienced by heterosexual couples
is primarily driven by female preferences and gender norms, and that the alternative shared par-
enting approach taken by same sex couples increases household income and may improve child
outcomes. Despite the persistence of the relative child penalty within heterosexual couples, his-
tory suggests that decreases in the relative child penalty are possible. In Figure 10 we graph the
child penalty of women and men in heterosexual couples from 1971-2010 using the long sample
of heterosexual couples (see Section 4.1). Note that each line represents the child penalty for chil-
dren born during a ve year interval, estimated using the event study approach from the previous
section (see equations (5) and (4)). The gure shows that the child penalty for women has de-
clined substantially over time. In the 1970’s and 1980’s, fathers not only didn’t experience a child
penalty, but actually obtained an increase in income on the birth of their rst child. However,
over time this child premium for fathers has decreased, and currently fathers largely experience
no change in income following the birth of their rst child. Combining the two graphs, while
the reduction in the relative child penalty has been substantial from the 1970’s until today, the
remaining gap is still large, and largely driven by the penalties experienced by mothers. In the
remainder of this paper we estimate the impact of two important policy tools aimed partly at de-
creasing this gap: Paid paternity leave which targets fathers and access to high quality childcare.
6.1 Paternity leave
As means for increasing fathers’ involvement in raising children, the so called daddy quotas of
the Scandinavian countries have attracted considerable interest. Starting as early as 1993, Nor-
way mandated a four week period of parental leave for fathers. If not taken, this leave period
could not be transferred to the mother. A number of other countries have introduced similar
quotas, including Ireland (14 weeks), Slovenia and Iceland (13 weeks), Germany (8 weeks), Fin-
land (7 weeks), and Portugal (6 weeks), see OECD (2014). Paternity leave, by forcing fathers to
spend more time with their children, might increase the value fathers place on time with chil-
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Figure 10: The child penalty in income over time for mothers and fathers in heterosexual couples
Note: Child penalties estimated separately by birth cohort of rst child in 5-year intervals. Estimated using the event
study framework from equations 5 and 4. Separate plots by birth cohort, including condence intervals, is found in
Figure gure A7 in the appendix.
dren (increasing β in equation (1)) and might also decrease the distaste fathers have for mothers
working outside the home (reducing α in equation (2)). Paternity leave could also increase the
productivity of fathers in home production (increasing k in equation (2)). Within the framework
of our model, all of these eects could decrease the relative child penalty. In Table 3 we report
every leave reform in Norway from 1992 - 2014. The maternal and paternal quota columns report
the amount of parental leave in weeks that is reserved exclusively for the mother and father. The
remaining leave can be shared among parents however they choose and is reported in column 6.
The reforms were generally announced in October the year before implementation as part of the
budgeting process, making it nearly impossible to plan conception in response to the announce-
ment of the quota change in order to manipulate birth dates around the cuto in April or July. In
Figure B1 in the Appendix, we verify that there is no statistically signicant change in the density
of births around the cuto for each reform.
In this paper, we exploit the 2005, 2006, 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2014 reforms using a regression
discontinuity design. As in all regression discontinuity designs, identication relies on continuity
in the underlying regression functions at the cuto. Our identication strategy exploits the fact
that parents of children born just before the reforms were not subject to the changes in parental
leave quotas, while parents of children born right after each reform were subject to the changes.
For this exercise, we draw on heterosexual couples from the main sample with rst children
born in 2005, 2006, 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2014. Because we want to capture mothers and fathers
exposed to the leave reforms, we include in the sample only couples where the mother took some
leave, indicating that she is eligible, because users of the alternative one-time benet would not
be aected. We do not believe there is reason to think that the extensive margin of maternity
leave use is aected by the reforms, because these changed the maternity leave quota at very
high margins of leave. Furthermore, the one-time benet is so small that it is highly unlikely
that any eligible mother would choose this over maternity leave. For fathers, we set leave to
zero for fathers where we observe no leave take-up. Appendix B.1 provides additional details
on the construction of our parental leave measure. We further restrict the sample to births in a
window around the reform date using the optimal bandwidth, see below. We begin by estimating
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Table 3: Parental leave reforms in Norway
Reform date Leave in Compensation Maternal quota Paternal Shared Max weeks
weeks in weeks quota leave mother
April 1st, 1992 35 (44.3) 100% (80%) 8 (2 before birth) 0 27 (36.3) 35 (44.3)
April 1st, 1993 42 (52) 100% (80%) 9 (3 before birth) 4 29 (39) 38 (48)
July 1st, 2005 43 (53) 100% (80%) 9 (3 before birth) 5 29 (39) 38 (48)
July 1st, 2006 44 (54) 100% (80%) 9 (3 before birth) 6 29 (39) 38 (48)
July 1st, 2009 46 (56) 100% (80%) 9 (3 before birth) 10 27 (37) 36 (46)
July 1st, 2011 47 (57) 100% (80%) 9 (3 before birth) 12 26 (36) 35 (45)
July 1st, 2013 49 (59) 100% (80%) 17 (3 before birth) 14 18 (28) 35 (45)
July 1st, 2014 49 (59) 100% (80%) 13 (3 before birth) 10 26 (36) 39 (49)
Source: NOU 2017:6 (2017)
the impact of each reform separately. We estimate a fuzzy RD separately for both mothers and
fathers and for each year using the following specication:
yit = βtLi + ft(xi) + it
Li = γ1(xi ≥ 0) + g(xi) + ηit (6)
Where xi, the running variable, is the number of days after the reform date that the child was
born. For the 2014 reform, which decreased the leave quota, the running variable is instead
coded as days before the reform. ft(xi) and g(xi) are local linear polynomials that are separate
on either side of the cuto. We use the optimal bandwidth that minimizes the mean squared
error of the RD estimate to dene the sample, and a triangular weighting function in order to
obtain estimates local to the cuto. Because the reforms dier in the quota change implemented,
we scale the rst stage and reduced form estimates to represent the impact of one additional
week of quota so that the reforms are comparable. We estimate and report robust bias-corrected
condence intervals (Calonico et al., 2014) together with the conventional, heteroskedasticity-
robust condence intervals.28 For details, see Cattaneo et al. (2018a,b).
28Many models in this section are estimated using the robust RD commands for Stata written by Matias D. Catta-
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The critical assumption for the validity of our RD approach is that the underlying regression
functions are continuous at the threshold. This implies that the population of couples around
the discontinuity are identical. In Table B1 in the appendix we report estimates that show that
on observables, individuals around the cuto are statistically indistinguishable from each other
with only a few exceptions. The exception is maternity leave use, which is no surprise given
the reform details in Table 3. For roughly the reforms where the total length of the maternity
quota and the shared leave was reduced, we see reductions in maternity leave use. Because these
reductions come from very high margins of maternity leave use, we think it is more likely that
any impact on long-term labor supply is driven by the much larger eects on paternity leave use
than these eects on maternity leave take-up. In Appendix B.3, we exploit the fact that some
of these reforms expanded the paternity leave use at the expense of the maternity leave, while
others expanded the total leave length. This allows us to instrument for both the maternity and
paternity leave use, conrming the baseline results of the eects of paternity leave.
Furthermore, if parents were able to manipulate either conception or birth at the cuto in
order to qualify for reforms, then we would expect a statistically signicant change in the density
of births around the cuto. In Figure B1 in the appendix, we show graphically that this is not the
case. The p-values reported in each panel are for a test of equal densities on either side of the
cuto, using methods from Cattaneo et al. (2017, 2018c). None of the tests reject that the densities
are the same.
We report rst stage estimates for these specications in Table 4, separately for each reform.
Results have been scaled to reect one week of quota expansion. We see clear and signicant
eects of all reforms , whether using robust bias-correcting inference or conventional inference
that only accounts for heteroskedasticity. In the appendix, we plot the reduced form and rst
stage estimates together for each of the six reforms in Figure B2, scaling by the quota increase
to get estimates that reect one additional week of quota. Despite the strong rst stages, the
reduced form estimates are relatively at for both mothers and fathers and we nd no signicant
dierences between couples where the father is exogenously exposed to greater paternity leave
neo and coauthors, whom we owe thanks. These include rdrobust, rddensity, rdbwselect and others. These packages
are documented in Calonico et al. (2018) and Cattaneo et al. (2018c)
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Table 4: RDD rst stage estimates
Reform year 2005 2006 2009 2011 2013 2014 Pooled Stacked
RD estimate per week 0.83*** 1.09*** 0.96*** 0.88*** 0.74** 0.78*** 1.26*** 0.88***
conventional standard error (0.34) (0.33) (0.094) (0.28) (0.24) (0.11) (0.13) (0.066)
robust standard error 0.42 0.40 0.11 0.33 0.28 0.13 0.14
conventional p-value 0.015 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
robust p-value 0.024 0.006 0.000 0.004 0.010 0.000 0.000
Observations 14,658 15,138 16,556 16,558 16,268 14,330 93,508 93,508
Optimal bandwidth 60.7 55.2 74.4 45.3 63.0 43.3 35.3
Ecient observations 5006 4,901 6,993 4,467 6,120 3,815 19,751 31,302
Weights in pooled 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.16
Weights in stacked 0.16 0.16 0.22 0.14 0.20 0.12
Quota increase 1 1 4 2 2 -4
Notes: Robust semiparametric sharp RD estimates of the eect of paternity leave reforms on paternity leave takeout
using optimal bandwidths, triangular kernel and local linear polynomials on either side of the cuto. All estimates
are scaled to reect one week of quota increase. Stacked estimates are the stacked individual cutos, allowing
polynomials to vary over cutos and using the cuto-specic bandwidths and weights. Conventional standard
errors are heteroskedasticity-robust, but not bias-corrected. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1, using conventional,
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
and couples who are not. These results suggest that paternity leave does not cause fathers to
parent more equally with mothers, at least not in such a way that mothers experience less severe
child penalties. Estimates are, however, somewhat imprecisely estimated.
In order to move beyond these separate reforms and increase the precision of our estimates,
we next stack all the reforms from above. The common way of doing this in RD studies is to
re-center the running variable to be zero at the relevant cuto for all individuals and run semi-
parametric RD estimates in the pooled sample. We call this the pooled estimate, and report the
rst stage specication for this procedure in Table 4. This estimate, however, restricts the func-
tional form of the local linear polynomials to be the same for all cutos, potentially increasing
the approximation error and lowering precision. An alternative and more straightforward way
to stack the estimates is to allow the local polynomials of the running variable to vary by cuto
and use the cuto-specic optimal bandwidths and kernel weights from the individual specica-
tions. Scaling is secured by using an indicator of the number of weeks of quota increase rather
than a dummy at the cuto. Unfortunately, we cannot calculate bias-corrected standard errors
for this specication, but we argue that the problem should be relatively minor. First, notice that
the dierence between the conventional and the robust standard error estimate for the pooled
specication is very small, indicating that the variance coming from the approximation error is
relatively minor. Second, the approximation error should be smaller for the stacked than the
pooled specication because we allow the local polynomials to dier between cutos and thus
approximate the unknown functions better. Nonetheless, inference from this specication is only
correct if the model is well specied, so that approximation error vanishes asymptotically.
The last two columns of Table 4 report the rst stage results from these specications. The
pooled estimate is - somewhat surprisingly - larger than most of the cuto-specic estimates,
indicating more than a one week increase in leave use per week increase in the paternity leave
quota.29 Second, although the estimate is highly signicant, notice that the standard error of the
pooled estimate is still larger than the most precisely estimated individual reform. In contrast, the
stacked specication delivers improved precision over any of the individual estimates, nding a
29For this specication, we scale the estimated parameter with the average number of weeks of quota increase in
the sample.
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more reasonable .88 weeks increase in leave use per week of quota increase.
Informed by this, we move to estimate fuzzy RD specications of the impact of paternity leave
use on mothers’ and fathers’ labor supply using the pooled and stacked models described above.
For the stacked estimates, we revert to the cuto-specic treatment indicators as instruments
because the fuzzy RD takes care of the scaling. This specication exactly reproduces the cuto-
specic rst stage estimates reported in Table 4 and so is a natural way to stack the reforms. When
interpreting these fuzzy RD estimates, it is important to keep in mind that these estimates are local
average treatment eects: they capture the eects of additional leave use on earnings for people
induced to use more leave because they were exposed to the reform. In our case, the compliers
represent unwilling users of paternity leave, because these couples were free to distribute more
leave than the quota to the father irrespective of the reform. In case of heterogeneous treatment
eects, the average eect for the compliers need not be the same as the average eect in the
population. Despite this, we argue that the LATE is a particularly policy relevant treatment eect
in our case, because it reects the eects of paternity leave use for fathers induced to take more
leave by the policy instrument, which is arguably the population of interest to policy makers.
The results from the stacked and pooled fuzzy RD estimates for mothers and fathers are pre-
sented together with the combined rst stages in Figure 11. The top panel illustrates how the
various reforms aected paternity leave takeout, mirroring the estimates from table 4 and show-
ing clear discontinuities at the cutos. The bottom two gures presents the impacts on mothers’
and fathers’ yearly incomes over time. Notice rst that there is no eect of paternity leave use
on pre-birth outcomes. This is a reassuring result, which can be interpreted as a balancing ex-
ercise or placebo test. Following birth, we see no impact of paternity leave use at years 0 and 1
when most of the leave takeout happens. Neither do we see any impact in the following years;
the estimates are at and centered at zero, conrming the ndings from before of little impact
of paternity leave use on child penalties. The stacked specication does, however, provide more
precise estimates than the results using separate reforms, ruling out positive impacts larger than
around NOK 5,000 on mother’s earnings per week of paternity leave use for all years post-birth.
To provide a sense of the potential percentage change in the child penalty, we re-scale the
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(a) First stage estimates
(b) Mothers (c) Fathers
Figure 11: Main RD estimates of paternity leave use
Note: Top panel shows rst stage estimates around each reform date, using local linear polynomials, tri-
angular weights and optimal bandwidths. Bottom panels show fuzzy RD estimates of the impact of an
additional week of paternity leave use on earnings over time, using all six reforms. Pooled estimate refers
to the simple reentered estimate, while the stacked estimate stacks the cuto-specic specications. Ro-
bust bias-correcting inference reported for the pooled estimate, conventional, heteroskedasticity-robust
inference for the stacked estimate.
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Figure 12: Scaled stacked and pooled fuzzy RD estimates, mothers
Note: Stacked fuzzy RD estimates for mothers, scaled by the estimated child penalties from the baseline
so that the estimates can be interpreted as the relative increase in the child penalty per week increase of
paternity leave use.
gures so that the y-axis represents the percentage of the child penalty, as estimated from the
event studies from the rst half of the paper. We present these results in Figure 12. While point
estimates remain close to zero, the lower bound of the eect is still informative. We can rule out
reductions larger than around 5 - 7% of the female child penalty per week of paternity leave use
for ages 1 through 5. Similar estimates for fathers are too imprecise to draw rm conclusions, in
part because the initial child penalty for fathers is very close to zero.
Results so far provide clear evidence that paternity leave use does not have a causal eect on
the distribution of market work within the couples induced to use paternity leave by the change in
quota. Paternity leave might, however, inuence gender norms or preferences around the distri-
bution of home work in ways that do not inuence labor market earnings. One possible measure
of such norms is the use of paternity leave itself for future children. To investigate whether pater-
nity leave use has a direct eect on the father’s choice of spending time with children, we exploit
the fact that many of the fathers that havea child around the time of the reforms subsequently
go on to have more children. We therefore estimate our fuzzy RD model using as an outcome
the father’s leave takeout for subsequent children for all children born up until and including
2014 in a setup similar to the peer eects estimates from Dahl et al. (2014).30 We cluster standard
errors on the father to account for the fact that each father may have multiple treated kids and
may get multiple subsequent kids for which we can measure outcomes. Notice that we cannot
use the 2014 reform for this exercise, as we cannot reliably measure paternity leave use for kids
born after 2014.
Table 5 provides the results of this exercise, both for each reform separately and the pooled
and stacked estimates for all reforms. Across the rows of Table 5, we see little evidence of any
permanent impact on norms as measured by takeout of paternity leave for later kids: Except for
the 2013 reform, where the ecient sample size is only 150 children and we nd a marginally
signicant eect, none ofof the reforms provide any statistically signicant results, and point
estimates are negative. Focusing on our preferred stacked estimates, the results indicate non-
30 Notice that if fertility is endogenous to the parental leave reforms, this might constitute an endogenous sample
selection criteria. Hart et al. (2019) investigates fertility response to the 2009 reform, nding no evidence of such
eects.
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Table 5: Paternity leave norms: Fuzzy RD of paternity leave use on leave for subsequent kids
2005 2006 2009 2011 2013 Pooled Stacked
RD estimate -0.15 -0.25 -0.064 -0.47 0.71* -0.21 -0.11
conventional standard error (1.49) (0.38) (0.15) (0.38) (0.34) (0.16) (0.13)
robust standard error 1.81 0.45 0.18 0.45 0.40 0.19
conventional p-value 0.92 0.51 0.67 0.21 0.037 0.20 0.39
robust p-value 0.95 0.57 0.72 0.15 0.039 0.18
Observations 13,476 13,019 11,531 7,918 746 46,690 46,690
Optimal bandwidth 58.0 66.0 65.2 63.9 42.3 70.3
Ecient observations 4,455 4,955 4,288 3,052 150 18,896 16,900
Notes: Fuzzy RD estimates of the impact of one more week of paternity leave for a child on the weeks of paternity
leave use for subsequent children. Standard errors are clustered by father. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
signicant eect of .11 less weeks of leave for subsequent children for each week of leave for the
rst child. This relatively precise estimate allows us to rule out eects larger than about .14 more
weeks of leave. An important caveat for these results is that some fathers might be constrained to
corner solutions also for later kids. If paternity leave use aects preferences for future paternity
leave in a way that would make fathers prefer to take more leave, but still not prefer to take
more than the quota, this RD specication would not be able to detect the eect. Nonetheless,
we conclude that there is little evidence for paternity leave quotas to permanently aect fathers
preferences for staying home with children as measured by their leave taking behavior.
The results in this section cover a variety of dierent paternity leave expansions. Despite the
number of reforms we study and the strength of the rst stages, we never nd a statistically sig-
nicant impact of paternity leave on income, child penalties or leave use for subsequent children.
Based on these results, we conclude that paternity leave does not appear to reduce the relative
child penalty.
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6.2 Improved access to early child care
An alternative approach to reduce the relative child penalty is for the government to provide a
high quality substitute for mother’s time. Figure 13a shows the child care coverage rates over time
in Norway, separately by age of the children. These gures show that the formal care sector for
preschoolers was well developed in Norway by the early 2000’s, with more than 80% of Norwegian
3 - 5 year olds attending care.31 For toddlers, however, coverage was much lower at less than 50%
and 30%, respectively, and the market was strongly rationed. These facts are documented in
greater detail in Andresen and Havnes (2019), including additional evidence from surveys on the
actual and preferred modes of child care for children at these ages. The underrepresentation of
children between ages 1 and 2 in formal care was the impetus for the Child Care Concord in 2002, a
broad, bipartisan agreement to increase the availability of care for toddlers. Following this reform,
coverage increased rapidly for 1-2 year olds over the next years as shown in Figure 13a. However,
the expansion varied considerably between municipalities and over time, as shown in Figure 13b.
This is the variation exploited to estimate the eects of formal care use on parents’ labor supply
in Andresen and Havnes (2019). We use the same variation to estimate the impact of increasing
access to high quality formal child care on the child penalties experienced by mothers and fathers
in this section. Andresen and Havnes (2019) shows that the exact timing of expansion was subject
to a range of constraints that were hard to predict, and the timing of expansion was not necessarily
easy to predict even for the municipalities themselves. Furthermore, the exact timing of expansion
only to a minor extent seems to be predictable by pre-reform characteristics of the municipalities,
as documented in Figure 14, making the expansion of care availability a potential instrument for
the endogenous choice of how much child care to use. For this application, we start with all
children from the main sample born in the years 2000-2006. This restricts the sample to children
who are two years old around the time of the reform-induced expansions of care.32 We assign
children to their municipality of residence at the age of 1 and look at couples where both parents
reside in that municipality when the child is 1. While much of the literature restricts the sample to
31The prevalence of care is the result of a reform and gradual expansion of formal care for these children in the
1970’s (Havnes and Mogstad, 2011).
32This includes a few thousand twins. Clustering at the municipality level accounts for within-family clustering.
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Figure 13: Child Care Coverage
Source: Statistics Norway Statistikkbanken, tables 09169 and 07459.
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(b) Child care coverage for 2-year olds
Figure 14: Predicting expansion of slots from pre-reform characteristics
Note: Results from regression of our two instruments, child care coverage at age 1 and 2, on municipality- and
year xed eects and an interaction of pre-reform characteristics interacted with year dummies, in a sample of
municipalities over time. Plotted are the year-specic impact of the pre-reform characteristics on expansion of care
in a particular year. 95% condence intervals in grey, clustered at the municipality level.
children without younger siblings, we view future fertility as a potentially endogenous outcome
of the reform, and therefore do not restrict the sample to youngest children. To be consistent
with the results we have presented thus far, we look at the eects on maternal and paternal
income when the child is between the ages 0 through 5, and use the years before birth as placebo
outcomes. This leaves us with a sample of 116,480 couples.33
For this sample, we take our baseline event study specication separately for mothers and
fathers and separately at each event time and see how adding the measure of individual child
care use at ages 13 to 36 months aects the child penalty. Because child care is endogenous to
labor supply, we instrument care use with the expansion of slots for 1-year olds at age 1 and for
2-year olds at age 2 in the following IV model:
yit = pik + γTit + βait + φmi + it
mi = p˜ik + γ˜Tit + β˜ait + φ1CC
1
k + φ2CC
2
k + ˜it (7)
Where γTit are calendar year xed eects, pik are municipality xed eects, βait are age xed
eects for the parent (in years) and mi is our measure of child care use from ages 13 - 36 months
from the cash for care data. The instruments are CC1k , the share of slots for 1-year olds in the
municipality at age 1 to the population of one year olds, and CC2k , the same share for 2-year olds,
measured at the relevant age of the child.
The variation we exploit thus comes from the variation in expansion of care across munici-
palities and over time. As long as the exact timing of expansion of care is uncorrelated with other
drivers of parents’ labor supply, our approach recovers the causal eect of an extra year of early
child care on labor supply for the compliers: the mothers who take up the newly expanded slots.
Because child care was strongly rationed before the reform, it is natural to think of the compliers
33Notice that because we restrict to rst born children, the sample size in this paper is a little less than half the
size of the samples of cohabiting mothers and fathers in Andresen and Havnes (2019). This gives us less precision
but is consistent with the rest of the paper. Because of the inherent focus on labor supply over time, we also measure
child care use throughout the full 13 - 36 months period we can measure, in contrast to the preceding paper that is
mostly concerned with child care use and labor supply during the calendar year the child turns 2.
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as the mothers of children who wanted child care before the reform, but were restricted by the
low supply. Figure 14 provides some support for the idea that expansions did not systematically
vary across municipalities with dierent pre-reform characteristics (except, of course, the initial
coverage rate), while Andresen and Havnes (2019) provide a range of specication checks that
demonstrate the robustness of the instrument.
First stage estimates from this specication are presented in Table 6, column 1, where we see
that the availability of slots in care has a strong inuence on years of early care use. Expansions
of care both at age 1 and at age 2 have a strong impact on child care use between 13 and 36
months, with an additional slot in care at age 1 increasing care use by around 0.8 years and at age
2 by about 0.6 years. Because our endogenous variable captures the intensity of use throughout
the full period, these coecients are not 1; as additional slots are generally opened in August,
children may not have the chance to exploit them to capacity the whole year. The IV strategy
thus scales the reduced form estimates to reect a full year of early child care use. The F -statistic
is around 200, indicating a very strong rst stage.
The second stage estimates from the baseline specication are presented in Figure 15a and
15b, where the baseline model discussed so far is indicated with diamonds. Focusing rst on the
years of treatment, ages 1-3, we see that the estimates increase in this period up to point estimates
of around 21,000 NOK at ages 2 and 3, where most of the treatment happens, only to return to
zero the last two years of the panel.34 Estimates are signicant at the 5% level at age 3 and 10%
level at age 2, and thus indicate that there is some immediate eects of child care use on earnings
during the years of treatment, perhaps driven by allowing mothers to return to work earlier after
child birth. Results for fathers are noisy, but point, if anything, to negative impacts on earnings,
which could also reduce relative child penalties. The pre-birth outcomes, which we can think
of as placebo outcomes, indicate small and insignicant impacts of future child care use on past
earnings, supporting the estimation strategy.
As a robustness check, we include the education level-specic age proles in equation 7. The
34This estimate is smaller than the baseline estimate in Andresen and Havnes (2019), but a number of dierences
in the sample and specication may explain this, as well as the lower level of precision in our study due to a sample
size than half the size because of the focus on rst born children only.
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Table 6: First stage estimates, formal care use
Years of child care use at ages 13 - 36 months
Coverage rate at age 1 0.891*** (0.0503) 0.879*** (0.0516)
Coverage rate at age 2 0.589*** (0.0516) 0.588*** (0.0500)
Municipality xed eects X X
Year xed eects X X
Age proles X
Education-specic age proles X
N 116,478 116,461
mean dep. var 1.034 1.034
F 215.5 198.3
Note: First stage estimates of eq. 7 for mothers. Point estimates for fathers (not shown) are very similar. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality.
(a) Mothers (b) Fathers
Figure 15: Impact of a year of child care use at ages 13-36 months on income
Note: IV results from equation 7 reecting the impact on labor earnings in 1,000 NOK across child age for an extra
year of early child care use at ages 13-36 months.
rst stage from this specication is hardly aected by this, as documented by column 2 in table
6. The second stage results are also very similar.
The peak impacts on maternal labor supply are in the range of 21,000 NOK for ages 2-3. Like in
the paternity leave application, it is natural to ask how big this impact is in light of the estimated
child penalty from Section 5. In Figure 16, we therefore scale the IV estimates for mothers with
the estimated baseline child penalties to present the relative eect of a full year of child care use
on the child penalty. Results show that the child penalty is reduced by a little more than 25% for
mothers when their children are between the ages 2-3. We conclude that early child care shows
more promise as a policy tool for reducing child penalties than paternity leave, although it does
not appear to have a permanent impact.
6.3 Conclusion
In the rst half of this paper we show that same sex couples experience a very dierent child
penalty compared to heterosexual couples. Based on our household model, we conclude that
while biology plays a small role in explaining the relative child penalty experienced by hetero-
sexual couples, some combination of preferences and gender norms explain the vast majority of
the relative child penalty experienced by heterosexual couples. Moreover, the large child penalty
experienced by heterosexual mothers translates into a signicant household income penalty for
heterosexual couples that persists over time. In contrast, while lesbian couples experience the
same sized household income penalty initially (albeit shared more evenly between the two part-
ners), the overall household income penalty decreases over time until ve years after birth lesbian
couples no longer experience a household income penalty from having children. This is despite
the fact that lesbian couples have a similar number of children compared to heterosexual cou-
ples and our descriptive evidence suggests that children of lesbian parents outperform children
of heterosexual couples in test scores at age 10.
In the second half of the paper we examined two possible policy responses to the relative
child penalty. First, government policy might aim to address the behavior of fathers, and the
most commonly proposed such policy is paternity leave. Second, governments might provide a
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Figure 16: Eects of a year of early child care use on the child penalty
high quality child care substitute for households to utilize in place of the mother’s time. Using
a series of adjustments to paternity leave in Norway and a regression discontinuity framework,
we show that while fathers take paternity leave (the rst stage is strong), paternity leave has no
impact on the relative child penalty. In addition, paternity leave has no impact on whether the
father takes additional leave for future children. Next, we use an instrumental variables approach
exploiting the staggered expansion of care following a Norwegian child care reform and show
early child care use reduces the child penalty for mothers by around 25% per year of use in the
years of treatment. These results suggest that if policy makers wish to decrease the relative child
penalty, they should focus on providing better child care to families, not on oering paternity
leave to fathers.
Our paper sheds light on both why the child penalty occurs and how policy might impact the
relative child penalty. While we have focused on two of the most commonly proposed policies to
reduce the child penalty, there are a number of additional policy changes that could impact the
child care penalty dierently and that would be productive avenues for future research.
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A Additional results, child penalties
Table A1 summarizes the predictions of the theoretical model from Section 2, while simulations
of various mechanisms are found in Figure A1.
Mean earnings over time for the three couple types are found in Figure A2 together with
the simple event study estimates that omit age- and year xed eects. Figure A3 allows the
age-gender proles to be dierent for parents with dierent education levels, without this sub-
stantially changing the baseline estimates
In Figure A4 we plot the mean number of children over time for each parent type, suggesting
that fertility by 5 years later is very similar across heterosexual and lesbian couples. Figure A5
performs the baseline event study approach using only the couples where neither of the spouse
has additional kids by age 5. Although this is an endogenous sample selection, so we should be
careful in interpreting these estimates, results are relatively similar to the baseline estimates.
Figure A6 provides subsample analysis by (birthing) mother’s education, revealing relatively
similar eects across groups.
Finally, Figure A7 provides estimates of child penalties separately by time period, as measured
in 5-year intervals from 1971 to 2010.
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Figure A1: Model Predictions: Simulations for Gender Norms and Specialization
Note: Left panels show individual income penalties relative to full time income in period 1, and right panels show
child penalty by couple type. To produce the simulations we set h(1− ti) = 1− ti. The baseline parameter values
are: ka = kb = 1, λa = λb = .5, and β = 5. At baseline, wages of both partners are normally distributed with
mean 10 and standard deviation 1. At baseline α = η = δ = 0. In panel 1, we solve for 100 equally spaced grid
points of δ ∈ [0, 1]. In panel 2 we solve for 100 equally spaced grid points of α ∈ [0, 40]. In the last panel, we vary
the mean of wa between 10 and 30.
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Figure A2: Mean earnings by event time (left) and raw child penalties (right)
Note: Left panels show show means of annual labor earnings for the years before and after birth of the rst child.
Right panels show simple event study estimates without year and age proles. Sample construction and data as
dened in section 4. Note that the scale of the y-axes are separate for gay couples compared to heterosexual and
lesbian couples.
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Figure A3: Controlling for education- and gender-specic age proles
Figure A4: Number of children over time by parent type
Figure A5: Only couples where no partner has additional kids until t+ 5
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(a) Heterosexual couples, high ed. mother (b) Lesbian couples, high ed. mother
(c) Heterosexual couples, low ed. mother (d) Lesbian couples, low ed. mother
Figure A6: Subsample analysis by level of mother’s education: High school or below vs. more
than high school
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Figure A7: The child penalty over time, heterosexual couples
Note: Child penalties estimated from equation 4 for heterosexual couples, separately by birth year of the rst child
in ve year bins. Mothers in solid lines, fathers in dashed lines, 95% condence intervals (gray area) calculated
using bootstrap, clustering at couple.
Table A1: Summary of the predictions of the model
Individual Child Penalty
Heterosexual Lesbian Gay
Preferences (η) Female spouse Both spouses (<hetero) Neither spouse
Biology (α) Female spouse One spouse Neither spouse
Gender norms (δ) Female spouse Neither spouse Neither spouse
Specialization (wa
ka
− wb
kb
) Female spouse One spouse One spouse
Relative Child Penalty
Heterosexual Lesbian Gay
Preferences (η) Yes No No
Biology (α) Yes Yes No
Gender norms (δ) Yes No No
Specialization (wa
ka
− wb
kb
) Yes Yes Yes
B Parental leave measures and robustness
B.1 Measuring parental leave
The FD-Trygd database provides data on all spells of leave for Norwegian parents. Technically,
there are ve types of leave spells recorded. In addition to the regular parental leave spells, there
are pregnancy leave spells, available for mothers with jobs that impose health risks to the unborn
child, such as chemicals or heavy lifts, leave spells for adopted children, combined leave spells
and other leave spells. In practice, more than 97% of the leave spells recorded are for regular leave
spells , and we focus on these.
Unfortunately, the data does not contain direct links to the child or children for which the
leave is taken, only to the individual who takes leave. We therefore have to infer the relevant child
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from the birthdates of the children. To this end, we assign a parent’s leave spell to a particular
child if it
• starts no earlier than 60 days before the birth of the child, and
• starts no later than 3 years after the birthdate of the child, and
• starts no later than 60 days before the birthdate of the next child to the same parent
This mirrors the rules for parental leave, which can be taken up to the age of three, but any
remaining leave not taken by the time the next child is born, is lost. Using this procedure, we
match 99.45% of all leave spells to a particular child.
The data makes no distinction between leave spells with 80% and 100% wage compensation.
We are interested in the number of weeks at home with the child, so that this distinction does
not matter, but we treat a day of leave at 80% compensation the same as a day of leave at 100%
compensation. In contrast, it is possible to take graded leave, meaning that a parent will have a
leave spell where he or she works part-time. In these cases, we compute the number of ecient
days at home for each leave spell. Following this, we collapse the total length of all spells for a
particular time and scale it to represent weeks of total leave.
Finally, we observe a small number of parents who according to this measure takes longer
leave than the total leave allowance, even at 80% compensation. We therefore cap 1.15% of moth-
ers and 0.08% of fathers in our sample who are observed with more than 60 weeks of leave to 60
weeks.
B.2 Additional gures and tables, paternity leave
Table B1 provides sharp RD balancing tests for a range of covariates in the baseline RD model.
Figure B1 provide robust local polynomial estimates of the density of births around the cuto.
Reduced form and rst stage estimates separately by reform is plotted in Figure B2.
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Table B1: Sharp RD balancing tests
Variable Reform year 2005 2006 2009 2011 2013 2014 Pooled Stacked
Father’s RD estimate 0.060 -0.19 0.034 -0.090 0.087 -0.046 -0.016 0.0060
age s.e. (0.23) (0.25) (0.067) (0.12) (0.13) (0.071) (0.058) (0.039)
robust p 0.70 0.46 0.72 0.37 0.44 0.62 0.84
Mother’s RD estimate 0.20 0.14 0.025 -0.19 0.17 0.0043 0.030 0.026
age robust s.e. (0.25) (0.27) (0.071) (0.16) (0.16) (0.080) (0.071) (0.045)
robust p 0.49 0.59 0.91 0.30 0.30 0.84 0.71
Maternity RD estimate 1.01** 0.048 -0.32*** -0.17 -0.088 -0.65*** -0.35*** -0.32***
leave robust s.e. (0.48) (0.50) (0.11) (0.23) (0.21) (0.12) (0.10) (0.069)
robust p 0.040 0.96 0.019 0.57 0.85 0.00 0.0075
Father’s RD estimate 0.085 -0.28 -0.027 -0.059 -0.019 0.0017 -0.030 0.0060
years of ed. robust s.e. (0.19) (0.19) (0.051) (0.073) (0.089) (0.055) (0.041) (0.027)
robust p 0.90 0.18 0.42 0.50 0.84 0.88 0.42
Mother’s RD estimate -0.049 -0.34* 0.044 -0.053 0.094 0.045 0.014 0.033
years of ed. robust s.e. (0.19) (0.19) (0.045) (0.090) (0.088) (0.050) (0.038) (0.029)
robust p 0.74 0.074 0.36 0.51 0.28 0.34 0.78
Father’s RD estimate -0.0047 0.0069 -0.0035 0.0030 -0.0087 -0.0041 -0.0033 -0.0030*
ed. missing robust s.e. (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0025) (0.0049) (0.0067) (0.0033) (0.0025) (0.0016)
robust p 0.54 0.39 0.23 0.46 0.17 0.31 0.21
Mother’s RD estimate -0.019** -0.0075 -0.0029 -0.0021 -0.0056 -0.0045 -0.0065*** -0.0042**
ed. missing robust s.e. (0.0097) (0.0093) (0.0027) (0.0040) (0.0064) (0.0036) (0.0021) (0.0017)
robust p 0.073 0.38 0.38 0.63 0.34 0.39 0.005
Note: Robust semi parametric sharp RD estimates of the eect of paternity leave quotas on balancing variables using
optimal bandwidths, triangular kernel and local linear polynomials on either side of the cuto. All estimates are
scaled to reect one week of quota increase. Pooled estimates are the simple re-centered robust RD estimates across
all six cutos. Robust bias-corrected inference except for the stacked estimates, where standard errors are robust,
but not bias-corrected. * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01, based on the robust, but not bias-corrected standard
errors (themselves not reported).
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Figure B1: Density plots below and above cutos
Note: Graphs show density estimates above and below the cuto using methods described in Cattaneo et al. (2017)
and implemented in Cattaneo et al. (2018c). p-values reported are for a bias-corrected test of whether the densities
at the cutos are equal.
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B.3 Accounting for eects of maternal leave
As evident from Table 3, several of the reforms aected not only the paternity leave quota, but
also the maternity leave quota and the sum of the maternity leave quota and the shared leave.
As documented in Table B1, this resulted in reduced maternity leave take-up roughly for the
reforms where the total time a mother could take o work was reduced. Although we argue that
this change in maternity leave takeup is relatively minor compared to the change in paternity
leave, and at much higher margins, we might worry that it is partly the changed maternity leave
that causes any changes in later labor market outcomes, not paternity leave.
To investigate this, we exploit the fact that some of the reforms expanded the paternity leave
quota at the expense of maternity leave, while others lengthened the total leave. This means that
we can exploit the stacked RD specication to get independent variation in the reform-induced
shifts to both maternity and paternity leave use in a 2SLS setup:
yirt = β
L
t Li + β
M
t Mi + ϕ
0
rxi1(xi < 0) + ϕ
1
rxi1(xi ≥ 0) + pir + irt
Lir = γLQQir + γLSSir + ϕ
L0
r xi1(xi < 0) + ϕ
L1
r xi1(xi ≥ 0)] + piLr + ηLir
Mir = γMQQir + γMSSir + ϕ
M0
r xi1(xi < 0) + ϕ
M1
r xi1(xi ≥ 0)] + piMr + ηMir (8)
where Lir and Mir are paternity and maternity leave takeup for couple i who is exposed to
reform r. Rather than a dummy at the cuto, the instruments are now Qir, the paternity leave
quota, and Sir, the sum of shared leave and maternity leave quota. Notice that the variation
in these two instruments are determined solely by the cuto in birthdates, and that we have
independent variation to separate the eects of both instruments because we stack all six reforms
to parental leave. As before, we use local linear polynomials that are separate on either side of
the cuto for each reform and a triangular kernel to control for the forcing variable. The outcome
variable yirt is labor market earnings, measured separately for mothers and fathers. This leaves
us with two treatments by two outcomes per year we measure outcomes.
When instrumenting for two endogenous variables in an IV-setup, it is not clear how to de-
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termine the optimal MSE-reducing bandwidth as before. We therefore use a) the MSE-reducing
optimal bandwidth for the rst stage of either of the instruments or b) a xed 50-day bandwidth.
As before, we report robust, but not bias-corrected standard errors for the stacked specication.
First stage results for the two endogenous variables are reported in Table B2. Notice that inde-
pendent variation to identify both eects rely on stacking all reforms, so that we cannot perform
these estimates separately by reform. Notice rst that the choice of bandwidth is not of essence:
The results are very similar whether we use either of the MSE-reducing optimal bandwidths or
a xed 50-day window. Second, note that the reforms work exactly as we would expect: An in-
crease in the daddy quota of 1 week increases paternity leave uptake by almost exactly 1 week
when we control for changes to the remaining quota for the mother. Increasing the remaining
leave for the mother (comprising maternal quota and the weeks of shared leave) increases mater-
nity leave take up by 0.7 to 0.8 weeks. In contrast, the instruments do not work across spouses:
Weeks of paternity leave quota does not aect maternity leave use when controlling for the re-
maining share available to the mother, in contrast to the balancing exercise in Table B1, while the
remaining share for the mother does not aect leave update for the father when controlling for
his own quota. Thus, the stacked specication where we instrument for both parents’ leave take
up circumvents the problem of the reforms aecting both margins of leave. Because the choice
of bandwidth does not seem to matter and because we’re primarily interested in the eects of
paternity leave, we present fuzzy stacked RD estimates based on this specication using the pa-
ternity leave-optimal bandwidth from panel C. As in the base model in the paper we also revert to
the reform-specic dummies as instruments when reporting the IV estimates rather than quota
measures.
Results from the stacked fuzzy RD model where we instrument for both mothers’ and fathers’
leave take up is presented in Figure B3. The top panels present eects of paternal leave on moth-
ers’ and fathers’ earnings by child age, mirroring the estimates from the baseline model. For
reference, the coecients and condence intervals from the stacked fuzzy RD model where we
instrumented for paternity leave use only is added. Except perhaps for the outlier at child age 4,
the double IV model provides estimates that are well in line with the baseline model, conrming
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Table B2: First stage eects of maternity and paternity leave quotas
Weeks of leave Bandwidth
Mother Father reform bw N
A: 50-day bandwidth
Paternity leave quota 0.066 1.00*** 2005 50 4,037
(Qir) (0.14) (0.16) 2006 50 4,303
2009 50 4,192
Remaining leave for mother 0.77*** 0.18 2011 50 3,656
(Sir) (0.21) (0.21) 2013 50 4,830
joint F 21.1 76.5 2014 50 3,502
N 24,520
B: Maternity leave-optimal bandwidth
Paternity leave quota 0.069 0.96*** 2005 66.9 5,418
(Qir) (0.14) (0.15) 2006 61.3 5,271
2009 42.4 4,017
Remaining leave for mother 0.79*** 0.12 2011 43.8 4,252
(Sir) (0.20) (0.20) 2013 57.7 5,538
joint F 24.8 79.7 2014 52.4 4,532
N 29,028
C: Paternity leave-optimal bandwidth
Paternity leave quota 0.055 0.98*** 2005 58.0 4,770
(Qir) (0.14) (0.15) 2006 68.4 5,844
2009 44.6 4,192
Remaining leave for mother 0.73*** 0.12 2011 37.4 3,656
(Sir) (0.21) (0.21) 2013 55.3 5,380
joint F 18.0 74.9 2014 40.8 3,502
N 27,344
Note: First stage results from stacked specication of all six parental leave reforms, instrumenting for weeks of
paternity and maternity leave take up as described in eq. 8. Panel A) uses a xed 50-day bandwidth, panel B) uses
the MSE-reducing optimal bandwidth for each reform if instrumenting for maternity leave only, panel C) the same for
paternity leave. Heteroskedasticity robust, but not bias-corrected standard errors. ′∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05.∗∗∗p < 0.01
the precise zero eects of paternity leave on mothers’ subsequent labor earnings. Just like in the
basic model, it does not seem like paternity leave has a potential for reducing the child penalty.
The double IV specication inadvertently also estimates the eects of another week of maternity
leave on parents later earnings. Results are too imprecise to draw strong conclusions, but provide
no evidence of any eects. In short, parental leave policies does not seem like a promising tool
for reducing the child penalties in Norway.
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(a) Paternity leave on mother’s earnings (b) Paternity leave on father’s earnings
(c) Maternity leave on mother’s earnings (d) Maternity leave on father’s earnings
Figure B3: Eects of maternity and paternity leave use on mothers’ and fathers labor earnings
Note: Top panels shows the impact of a week of paternity leave use on mothers’ (left) and fathers’ (right) earnings over
time, as estimated from a double IV stacked fuzzy RD as detailed in eq. 8. For comparison we also show our stacked
fuzzy RD estimates from the baseline model where we only instrument for the weeks of paternity leave. Bottom
panels show the impact of an additional week of maternity leave on mothers’ (left) and fathers’ (right) earnings.
